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Abstract
As technology feature size continues to shrink, we see two challenging problems in the design of
computer systems. One is the hardware unreliability due to increasing chances of transient hardware
faults caused by high-energy particles and temperature hot spots. The other is the variability in the
semiconductor manufacturing process, which manifests itself as a large variation in gate lengths,
threshold voltage, and other parameters within a wafer and even within a die. This variability
eventually impacts the frequency and the leakage power dissipation of a chip.
In the first part of this thesis, we study the problem of handling I/O in memory-based check-
pointing systems. The increasing demand for reliable computers has led to proposals for hardware-
assisted rollback of memory state. Such approach promises major reductions in Mean Time To
Repair (MTTR). The benefits are especially compelling for database servers, where existing re-
covery software typically leads to downtimes of tens of minutes. Unfortunately, adoption of such
proposals is hindered by the lack of efficient mechanisms for I/O recovery.
We present and evaluate ReViveI/O, a scheme for I/O undo and redo that is compatible with
mechanisms for hardware-assisted rollback of memory state. We have fully implemented a Linux-
based prototype that shows that low-overhead, low-MTTR recovery of I/O is feasible. For 20–120
ms between checkpoints, a throughput-oriented workload such as TPC-C has negligible overhead.
Moreover, for 50 ms or less between checkpoints, the response time of a latency-bound workload
such as WebStone remains tolerable. In all cases, the recovery time of ReViveI/O is practically
negligible. The result is a cost-effective highly-available server.
In the second part of this thesis, we study architecture-aware fine-grain adaptive body biasing
to improve the frequency and leakage power dissipation of processor chips. As VLSI technology
continues to scale, parameter variation is about to pose a major challenge to high-performance
iii
processor design. In particular, the within-die variation of threshold voltage is directly detrimental
to the chip’s frequency and leakage power. One proposed technique to address such variation is
Fine-Grain Body Biasing (FGBB), where different chip sections called cells are given a certain
voltage bias that modifies the threshold voltage.
The insight of this work is that FGBB should be applied in an architecture-aware manner —
using cells that follow the shapes of architectural modules such as execution units or caches. The
reason is that architectural functionality affects the BB needed through temperature and type of
critical path. To prove this idea, we develop a novel model of threshold voltage variation and apply
it to simulated batches of chips. We show that architecture-aware FGBB (AA-FGBB) enables 35%
of the chips to work at the highest frequency, compared to 18% with advanced conventional FGBB
— potentially increasing each chip’s value by 50%. It also reduces the leakage of the chips by
40%, compared to 25% with advanced conventional FGBB. Overall, computer architecture plays
an essential role in mitigating parameter variations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Technology scaling poses serious challenges to computer designers and manufacturers. The most
notable problems are those related to reliability and variability.
It is believed that the rate of single-event upsets (SEU) — bit flip errors due to hits by cosmic
rays or radiation from the packaging material — per bit will stay more or less constant. This is
because the effects of the shrinking cross section and the decrease in Qcrit (minimum charge needed
to flip the state of a memory structure) cancel each other despite technology scaling. Combined
with Moore’s law, this implies that the rate of SEUs per system will grow exponentially. In
addition, it is also believed that temperature hot spots may cause bit flips in future technologies.
The problem of reliability can only be solved by means of redundancy (in time, space, or both).
Among the proposed reliability mechanisms, ReVive [61] is particularly interesting in that it has low
redundancy (N+1 in space and 6% in time) and high availability (five 9’s). It has been proposed for
a distributed shared-memory multiprocessor system that frequently checkpoints the system state
in memory. However, since ReVive does not support I/O, the mechanism is not readily applicable
to commercial systems. The main obstacle is the output commit problem. What if a machine sends
a message to a client and then rolls back to a state prior to sending the message? It is against the
causality and can also lead to an incorrect result if the re-execution is not deterministic. In this
thesis, we present ReViveI/O, a mechanism that adds supports for I/O to ReVive, thus completing
the full-system support for ReVive (and similar hardware-based memory-checkpointing systems).
We focus on the disk and network I/O because they are crucial for back-end database servers, which
interact with the outside world mostly through disk and network I/O. Chapter 2 elaborates on how
I/O can be efficiently supported in hardware-based memory-checkpointing systems. The proposed
scheme, ReViveI/O, mainly targets throughput-oriented workloads. It provides a fast I/O recovery
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mechanism that can be applied to a general class of hardware-based memory-checkpointing systems
and incurs very small fault-free execution overhead. ReViveI/O was implemented and tested on
multiprocessor Linux servers.
Variability is another challenge caused by technology scaling. Since the 180 nm technology
node, the feature size has always been smaller than the wavelength that is used in the lithography.
This results in inaccuracy in the printed circuits. In addition, as the number of dopant atoms (N)
in a channel decreases with the technology scaling, the random fluctuations, which are O(
√
N),
become no longer negligible. These process variations lead to variation in the threshold voltage
of MOSFETS, which in turn reduces the chip frequency and increases the subthreshold leakage
power dissipation. Although we can neither fix the printed circuit patterns nor change the number
of implanted dopant atoms, we can effectively control the resulting threshold voltage variation by
a technique called body biasing. Chapter 3 describes body biasing and shows efficient ways to use
body biasing to cope with process (P) and temperature (T) variation. Our work is one of the first
to study body biasing with both P and T variations taken into consideration. Our results clarify
the importance of architecture-awareness when applying body bias in a fine-grain manner.
2
Chapter 2
ReViveI/O: Efficient Handling of I/O
in Highly-Available
Rollback-Recovery Servers
2.1 Introduction to ReViveI/O
Highly-available shared-memory servers have to be able to cope with system-level faults. Faults
are often transient, such as hardware glitches caused by high-energy particles, or OS panic due
to unusual interleavings of software events. There are also permanent hardware faults, which can
bring down part of the machine. Fault frequencies are projected to remain high in the future. This
is worrisome, given the growing number of businesses with database applications that crucially
depend on their servers being up practically all the time.
One approach to attain fault tolerance is to employ extensive self-checking and correcting
hardware, often through redundancy and even lock-step execution. This is the approach used by
HP’s Nonstop Architecture [25] and IBM’s S/390 mainframes [71]. Unfortunately, this approach is
too expensive for many users.
An alternative approach is to use plain server hardware and support software-based checkpoint
and rollback recovery. In such systems, the operating system [41, 44, 66], virtual machine moni-
tor [9], or application (e.g., the database [21]) periodically checkpoints the state of the machine,
virtual machine, or processes, respectively, to safe storage. If a fault is detected, the system rolls
back to a state preceding the fault. However, since software checkpointing has significant overhead,
checkpoints are typically only taken every few minutes or less frequently. As a result, when a fault
occurs, the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is significant, and the machine becomes unavailable for
a sizable period. For example, the recovery time of Oracle 9.2 on a Solaris server is typically tens
of minutes [49].
A second shortcoming of software-based checkpointing appears in workloads where server and
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clients frequently exchange messages. To correctly support recovery, the server must delay sending
messages until after they are checkpointed. If checkpoints are infrequent to minimize overheads,
messages suffer long delays.
One way to significantly reduce server MTTR and avoid long message delays is to support
high-frequency checkpointing (e.g., one every few tens of milliseconds). Several architectures with
such support have been proposed [48, 52, 61, 72]. These architectures rely on hardware assistance
for checkpointing or for data buffering, logging or replication. For example, ReVive induces about
6% overhead and recovers from the types of faults supported in less than 1 second [61]. Such
tiny MTTR boosts machine availability. Moreover, as suggested by the ROC project, it opens up
opportunities to lower cost of ownership [59].
Unfortunately, past work on these high-frequency checkpointing architectures has focused on
recovering the memory state of the machine. It has not fully addressed the problem of rollback
recovery in the presence of I/O. When workloads perform I/O, rollback is tricky: how can the server
“undo” a disk write or a message send? Can it “redo” it? Unless these issues are addressed, the
proposed high-frequency checkpointing solutions are unusable. These issues are also particularly
relevant to architectures for transactional memory [23], which rely on the ability to roll back a
section of code and then re-execute it.
A known approach to handle I/O in checkpointing systems is to delay the commit of output
until the next checkpoint (output commit problem). To accomplish this, Masubuchi et al. [48]
proposed adding a “virtual” or “Pseudo” Device Driver (PDD) layer between the kernel and the
Device Drivers (DD). Disk output requests are redirected to the PDD rather than the DD. The
PDD blocks any output-requesting process until the next checkpoint [47], after which the output
is performed. Masubuchi et al.’s design has limitations, such as (i) blocking processes until a
checkpoint and (ii) only supporting disk I/O. However, their general method is attractive because
it requires no kernel or application modification. It can be built upon to provide efficient I/O
undo/redo for high-frequency checkpointing architectures.
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2.1.1 Contribution of This Work
Our main contribution is the full implementation, testing, and experimental evaluation of Re-
ViveI/O, an efficient I/O undo/redo scheme that is compatible with high-frequency checkpointing
architectures such as ReVive [61] and SafetyNet [72]. Our work completes the viability assessment
of such novel memory-recovery architectures. It is only through a complete implementation that
we identify true overheads, relevant ordering constraints, and corner cases. Moreover, we perform a
sensitivity analysis of what checkpoint frequencies are required to maintain acceptable throughput
and tolerable response times.
We also enhance Masubuchi et al.’s approach in two ways. First, the PDD now also supports
network I/O. Secondly, the disk PDD, rather than blocking the output-requesting process, quickly
buffers the output and returns. After the next checkpoint, the I/O operation is committed in the
background. This provides efficient I/O undo/redo.
We installed our ReViveI/O prototype on a Linux 2.4-based multiprocessor server running
TPC-C on Oracle, and WebStone on Apache. Our prototype shows that low-overhead, tiny-MTTR
recovery of I/O is feasible. Specifically, for 20–120 ms between checkpoints, a throughput-oriented
workload such as TPC-C has negligible overhead. In addition, for 50 ms or less between checkpoints,
the response time of a latency-bound workload such as WebStone on Apache remains tolerable. In
all cases, the recovery time of ReViveI/O is practically negligible. Finally, combining ReVive and
ReViveI/O is likely to reduce the throughput of TPC-C-class applications by 7% or less for 60–120
ms checkpoint intervals, while incurring a tiny MTTR of less than 1 second.
Our work is significant in that, with ReVive and ReViveI/O, a shared-memory server can
quickly recover from: (i) any hardware (and some software) transient faults in the machine, and
(ii) permanent faults that at most take out one node in the machine. Indeed, both the proces-
sor/memory state (thanks to ReVive) and the I/O state (thanks to ReViveI/O) are restored to
the preceding checkpoint within 1 second and transparently to the database. No ongoing database
transactions are lost.
There are rare faults for which ReVive cannot restore the processor/memory state, such as
the simultaneous permanent loss of multiple nodes. In this case, the fault is not transparent to
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the database. A few seconds after the machine is rebooted, ReViveI/O brings the I/O state to
its correct state at the preceding checkpoint. Then, we simply depend on the normal recovery
mechanisms of the database to reconstruct the state from the logs saved on disk.
The overall result is much higher server availability: the majority of faults are recovered from
with sub-second MTTR and transparently, while only infrequent faults require the much slower
recovery mechanism of the database.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Context of Our Work
The context of our work is shared-memory multiprocessors such as IBM’s eServer pSeries p5 595 [29]
or HP’s Integrity Superdome [26] used as back-end database servers. These servers store the
database in local disk subsystems and communicate over networks with many clients. They execute
transaction-processing applications similar to TPC-C.
A major issue in these systems is server uptime. Unfortunately, a high-energy particle impact
may cause a processor reset, an unusual data race may crash the OS, or a link failure may disconnect
a node. In these cases, transactions are typically aborted and the database attempts to recover.
Such recovery often renders the server unavailable for tens of minutes [49].
To understand the recovery requirements of these systems, note that I/O is practically limited
to disk and network. Moreover, these workloads are typically not latency bound. For example,
in TPC-C, 88% of transactions are NewOrder or Payment, which involve the exchange of a single
request and response between client and server. IBM’s p5 595 reports an average response time of
340 ms for these transactions [79]. Consequently, adding a few tens of ms to each transaction to
support a recovery scheme is tolerable.
2.2.2 Fault Model
We leverage proposed rollback-recovery architectures [48, 52, 61, 72] that support high-frequency
checkpointing (ten times or more per second) and, for the fault types supported, are able to recover
the memory state of the machine before the fault. These schemes typically have low overhead and
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a tiny MTTR.
As an example, we use ReVive [61] in this study. Appendix A outlines ReVive. With 100 ms
between checkpoints, ReVive has an average execution overhead of 6.3%. Moreover, it recovers
from the supported faults in under 1 second. This results in 99.999% availability even with one
fault per day.
Specifically, ReVive recovers the memory state of the machine for: (i) transient faults and
(ii) permanent faults that at most take out one node in the machine. Although fault detection
is beyond the scope of this study, the implicit assumption is that some mechanism detects these
faults within a checkpoint interval. Such short detection latency is more feasible for hardware faults
than for software ones. However, there are some software transient faults that are fail fast. For
example, Gu et al. [22] show that a sizable portion of kernel errors can be detected within 100,000
cycles. Overall, we refer to all these faults, from which ReVive can recover the memory state, as
Memory-Recoverable (MR) faults.
The other faults, from which ReVive cannot recover the machine’s memory state, we call Non-
Memory-Recoverable (NMR). An example is the simultaneous permanent loss of multiple nodes [61].
In this study, we also assume that non-volatile storage, namely disks and any closely-attached
non-volatile memories (NVRAMs), can only suffer transient faults. They have the appropriate
support (e.g., RAID 5) to avoid permanent faults.
With these assumptions, we will show that, for MR faults, we restore both the processor/memory
state (thanks to ReVive) and the I/O state (thanks to ReViveI/O) to the preceding checkpoint.
The restoration is transparent to the database. No ongoing transactions are lost (Figure 2.1).
Fault!
Memory-
recoverable?
Yes No
Roll back and recover
memory and I/O state
transparently to apps
Conventional recovery
by apps, if any
Make the I/O state
consistent (after reboot)
Figure 2.1: Faults handled by the combination of ReVive and ReViveI/O.
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For NMR faults, recovery is not transparent to the database. The machine has to be fixed and
rebooted. ReViveI/O then restores the I/O state to its consistent state at the preceding checkpoint.
Finally, the conventional recovery mechanisms of the database reconstruct the database state.
2.2.3 Integrating I/O with Checkpoints
Work on checkpointed message-based distributed systems [17, 35] shows how to support I/O
undo/redo under checkpointing. The commit of outputs is delayed until the next checkpoint (out-
put commit problem); only then can the system guarantee that it will not have to roll back to a
state prior to issuing the outputs.
To address the output commit problem without kernel modifications, Masubuchi et al. proposed
the Pseudo Device Driver (PDD) [48] (Figure 2.2). Disk output requests are redirected to the PDD
rather than the Device Driver (DD). The PDD blocks any output-requesting process until the next
checkpoint [47], after which the output is performed. The PDD can be considered an extremely
thin virtual machine layer for I/O checkpointing.
Kernel
Pseudo Device Driver (PDD)
Device Driver (DD)
Device
Figure 2.2: The Pseudo Device Driver software layer.
We enhance Masubuchi et al.’s scheme in two ways. First, processes requesting disk writes are
not blocked until the next checkpoint. Secondly, we also support network I/O. Kernel, DDs, and
server/client applications remain unmodified.
2.3 Architecture of the Prototype
This section describes the organization ReViveI/O, with key ordering issues, overheads, and limi-
tations.
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2.3.1 Description of Operation
We start by examining three properties that we leverage. Then, for readability, we describe Re-
ViveI/O in two steps: first, an initial incomplete solution, and then the complete one.
Properties Leveraged
We leverage three properties to build a low-overhead I/O undo/redo prototype. First, ReVive’s
ability to roll back the memory state is leveraged to restore PDD consistency after a fault. Specif-
ically, we assign to the PDD a portion of main memory called the Memory Buffer. In there, the
PDD buffers all the output requests until the next checkpoint; after the checkpoint, the outputs
are performed in the background and removed from the buffer. If a fault occurs, ReVive returns
the memory state to the previous checkpoint. This automatically makes the PDD consistent: all
the output requests in the current checkpoint interval disappear from the Memory Buffer, and all
those from the previous checkpoint interval re-appear in the Memory Buffer and are ready to be
performed again.
Second, the fact that the output operations under consideration are idempotent (i.e., replayable)
is leveraged to allow the recovery scheme to re-perform output operations without hurting correct-
ness. Indeed, disk output operations are trivially idempotent. Network output is idempotent due
to the high-level support provided by TCP [77]. With TCP, each packet has a sequence number.
If the client receives the same packet twice, TCP sees the same sequence number and discards one
of them1. Consequently, correctness is not compromised when, after a rollback, the requests in the
Memory Buffer force our scheme to re-write the same disk blocks and re-send the same messages.
Finally, properties of the I/O considered are leveraged to not have to buffer any inputs for later
“re-consumption” should rollback be needed. Specifically, disk inputs need no buffering because the
application will automatically re-issue them if it needs to. For network input, we avoid buffering by
again relying on TCP properties. With TCP, packets are acknowledged by the receiver; if the client
does not receive an acknowledgment (ACK) from the server within a timeout period, it resends the
1The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) does not provide TCP’s support to eliminate duplicates. UDP is unreliable
by definition, and the application (e.g., NFS over UDP) is responsible for dealing with duplicate and lost packets.
Consequently, we only focus on TCP.
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packet. In our design, ACKs, like all outgoing messages, are delayed by the server until after the
next checkpoint.
Consequently, suppose that the server receives an input message, issues an ACK that gets
stored in the Memory Buffer, and a fault occurs. Two cases are possible. First, if the fault occurs
before the end of the next checkpoint, the rollback removes the effect of the input message from
the server, as well as the ACK from the Memory Buffer. In this case, the ACK is not sent and
the client will resend the input message. If, instead, the fault occurs after the next checkpoint, the
rollback removes neither the effect of the input message from the server, nor the ACK from the
Memory Buffer. This case is also correct because the ACK will eventually be sent. In either case,
the server does not need to buffer network input.
Initial Incomplete Solution: BufferVolatile
All network and disk output requests issued by the application (OutReq1 and OutReq2 in Figure 2.3-
(a)) are transparently intercepted by the PDD and buffered in the Memory Buffer. The buffered
information includes the output data and metadata such as the destination block number in the
device. After the next checkpoint (C2 in Figure 2.3-(a)), the PDD passes the information to the
DDs, which perform the output operations (e.g., DMA writes to disk or to the network card) in
the background (OutOp1 and OutOp2 in Figure 2.3-(a)).
Consider now input requests, such as reads from the disk or the network card. On receiving the
request (InReq1 in Figure 2.3-(d)), the PDD checks if the requested data is in the Memory Buffer.
If so, the data is provided. Otherwise, the PDD passes the request to the DD, which performs the
operation in the background (InOp1 in Figure 2.3-(d)). As indicated in Section 2.3.1, no buffering
is needed.
We call this initial solution BufferVolatile. With it, if an MR fault (Section 2.2.2) occurs, the
server recovers both memory and I/O states transparently to the running application. Consider the
four possible timeframes wherein a fault can occur.
1. Fault before the end of the checkpoint that immediately follows the I/O request
(Fault 1 in Figures 2.3-(b) and (e)). In this case, ReVive rolls back the memory state to the previous
checkpoint C1. As a result, the Memory Buffer loses any record of output request OutReq1. This
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OutReq1 OutReq2 Logical Time
Checkpoint
OutOp1 OutOp2
C1 C2 C3
Fault 3 Fault 2
(a)
OutReq1 OutReq2
OutOp1 OutOp2
C1 C2
C3
(b)
OutReq1 OutReq2
OutOp1 OutOp2
C1 C2 C3
(c)
Fault 1
C4
Fault 3 Fault 2
OUTPUTS
InReq1 Logical Time
Checkpoint
InOp1
C1 C2 C3
Fault 2
(d)
InReq1
InOp1
C1
C2 C3
(e)
InReq1
InOp1
C1 C2 C3
(f)
Fault 1
Fault 3
Fault 2
INPUTS
Figure 2.3: I/O operations and faults in different scenarios. In the figure, InReq, OutReq, InOp, and
OutOp mean input request, output request, input operation, and output operation, respectively.
automatically “undoes” OutReq1, as desired. Thus, OutOp1 is not performed. As for input I/O,
since the rollback operation involves resetting the devices, any ongoing input operation such as
InOp1 is aborted.
2. Fault after the end of the checkpoint that immediately follows the I/O request; the
I/O is already performed (Fault 2 in Figures 2.3-(b) and (e)). ReVive rolls back the memory
state to the previous checkpoint C2. The only interesting case is for outputs. The Memory Buffer
gets restored to the state it had at C2, where it contained a record of the output operations to
perform. Consequently, the PDD will eventually automatically re-issue OutOp1 and OutOp2 to the
DDs. This is correct because of the idempotent nature of the I/O in consideration.
3. Like Case 2 but the background I/O is not yet completely performed when the fault
occurs (Fault 3 in Figure 2.3-(b)). As the system rolls back, the devices are reset and the ongoing
I/O is aborted. Then, all I/O operations (OutOp1 and OutOp2) will eventually be performed again.
4. Special case: Fault in an interval preceded by a checkpoint overlapped with an I/O
operation. Sometimes, an I/O operation initiated before a checkpoint extends past it. This is
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seen for OutOp2 in Figure 2.3-(c) and InOp1 in Figure 2.3-(f). If a fault such as Fault 2 or Fault 3
in these figures occurs, the memory state rolls back to the checkpoint that overlapped with the I/O
operation. During the recovery process, the I/O operation (OutOp2 or InOp1) gets killed, since
all I/O devices (disk controller and network adapter) get reset. This is discussed in Section 2.3.3.
Unfortunately, the rollback would leave the memory state in inconsistent state: while the I/O
operation is killed, it is incorrectly marked “in progress”, and it is only partially performed.
To solve this problem, after the recovery process rolls back the memory state to the previous
checkpoint, the PDD re-issues to the DDs any checkpoint-overlapping I/O operation from the
beginning. Note that the PDD can find out what are the I/O operations that are (incorrectly)
marked “in progress” (OutOp2 and InOp1). Optionally, the PDD can skip re-issuing the network
input operations that overlapped with the checkpoint: there is no need to re-initiate the transfer
of data from the network adapter to memory because TCP will ensure that incoming packets are
retransmitted.
Appendix A gives more formal argument about BufferVolatile using state transition diagrams.
Overall, our BufferVolatile scheme ensures database consistency in an environment with MR faults
(and/or transient faults in non-volatile storage as per Section 2.2.2). For example, assume that
a client starts a transaction that involves writes to disk (Figure 2.4-(a)). After the disk PDD
has buffered the data and destination block number in the Memory Buffer, the database sends
a response message to the client. The message is buffered by the network PDD. After the next
checkpoint, the message is sent and the write is issued to the disk. If an MR fault occurs before this
checkpoint, BufferVolatile will roll back and eventually receive the automatic retransmission of the
original request message after the timeout. Moreover, if the PDD observes a transient disk error
when it issues the write, it will simply retry until it succeeds. In any case, when the client receives
the response message, it can assume that the disk write in the transaction has been committed.
Some ordering issues are examined in Section 2.3.2.
Complete Solutions: Buffer and Rename
BufferVolatile is inadequate if an NMR fault (Section 2.2.2) occurs, such as the simultaneous per-
manent loss of multiple nodes. As an example, consider Figure 2.4-(a) after the second checkpoint.
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Figure 2.4: Operation of ReViveI/O. The scenario depicts a transaction with a disk write. NVRAM
and Dst stand for Non-Volatile RAM and the destination block number, respectively.
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Suppose that an NMR fault occurs after the response to the client is sent but before the disk is
updated in the background. ReVive cannot restore the contents of the Memory Buffer and, there-
fore, re-issue the buffered write to disk. The disk is left in a state that is inconsistent with the
information passed to the client. Note that conventional database recovery mechanisms cannot
help: the missing write can be a log write, without which the database cannot redo the operation.
To solve this problem, we enhance BufferVolatile to ensure that the PDD also saves the output
request information in non-volatile “temporary” storage before the next checkpoint. If an NMR
fault occurs as in the example just described, we can copy the information from the non-volatile
temporary storage to the server disk, and thus make the disk consistent. Then, we can rely on
the conventional mechanisms of the database for recovery, although the downtime will be longer
(Figure 2.1).
We propose two alternative schemes, called Buffer and Rename, as shown in Figures 2.4-(b) and
(c), respectively. Buffer is based on temporarily buffering output request data, and is conceptually
simpler. Rename is based on renaming the data, and can be more efficient because it requires
fewer disk writes. To describe the schemes, we focus on disk I/O because network I/O does not
distinguish between the schemes.
In Buffer, a disk write request updates the Memory Buffer and a disk buffer area before returning
(Figure 2.4-(b)). The update includes both the data and some metadata such as the destination
block number. To speed up this operation, the updates to the disk buffer are done on sequential
blocks. Moreover, the disk buffer can be a dedicated small, fast disk, similar to the Disk Caching
Disk [28]. After the next checkpoint, all data in the Memory Buffer are copied to their true locations
on the main disk. In fault-free conditions, the disk buffer is never read.
In Rename, a write request writes the output data to a new disk block in a rename area, and
saves the new logical-to-physical block number mapping in the Memory Buffer before returning
(Figure 2.4-(c)). During the checkpoint, the mappings in the Memory Buffer are copied to a small
(e.g., 32 MB) Non-Volatile RAM (NVRAM) associated with the disk. Later, the mappings in the
NVRAM are committed to disk in the background.
The NVRAM is not a single point of failure. Specifically, there are commodity disk adapters
with internal NVRAM where the NVRAM is transparently backed up by an additional copy of the
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data. An example is IBM’s Fast Write Cache [30]. Moreover, transient errors in the NVRAM or
associated disk are handled by the PDD retrying the request. Recall that we assume there are no
permanent faults in non-volatile storage.
Note that these NVRAMs usually work asynchronously — the data is destaged to the disk
only when the NVRAM is getting full or the data has stayed in the NVRAM for a certain time.
Therefore, if a fault occurs during a checkpoint, an asynchronous NVRAM could incorrectly write
its mappings to disk while we are rolling back to the previous checkpoint. This problem is solved
by also storing the original mapping information in the NVRAM, so that if the problem occurs, we
can undo the changes of mapping.
An important design issue in Rename is the policy for allocating the renamed blocks. One option
is to write the new blocks sequentially on a free disk area, just like the log-structured file system
(LFS) [65]. With this design, occasional defragmentation of the disk may be needed. Another
option is to map each block to either one of two physically consecutive blocks in the disk as in
TWIST [63]. This design requires double disk space for blocks. However, the mapping information
per block is only one bit, compared to (typically) 8 bytes for the first design.
With Buffer or Rename, the disk can always be brought to the state corresponding to the
checkpoint immediately preceding the fault, even for an NMR fault. Indeed, consider a disk write
request. If the fault happens between the request and the end of the next checkpoint, the contents
of the disk buffer are discarded (Buffer) or the new mapping information is not written to NVRAM
(Rename); the main disk remains unmodified and the client is never notified. If, instead, the fault
happens after the next checkpoint, a disk update is guaranteed to occur: the data and metadata
in the disk buffer (Buffer) or the mapping in NVRAM (Rename) are used to update the disk.
2.3.2 Ordering Issues
Our schemes (Buffer and Rename) change the timing of I/O operations. However, they always sat-
isfy the ordering properties of I/O in databases, which require that logs are fully committed before
data is. This is accomplished by updating the Memory Buffer and the disk buffer or rename area
in the order that the disk write requests are received. Moreover, after the subsequent checkpoint,
all updates are guaranteed to commit to their final storage locations.
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As the updates commit after the checkpoint, our schemes do not force disk write serialization
across different block addresses. Instead, the data blocks buffered in the Memory Buffer (or map-
pings in the NVRAM) are written to the final disk location in an overlapped manner. They can
even proceed with some re-ordering. Overlapping and re-ordering enables higher performance with-
out affecting correctness. In theory, the performance could be even higher than a system without
recovery.
We have seen that in all cases, if a client receives a transaction-completion message (Figure 2.4),
then disk updates are guaranteed to commit. Still, it is possible that the client receives the
completion message and sends another request before the server has physically finished the disk
writes. Even if this request needs to read the data that is still being written to disk, no race occurs.
The reason is that the PDD will automatically redirect the request to the Memory Buffer, which
only deallocates an entry when the final disk update is completed.
2.3.3 Overheads and Recovery Latency
Overheads
ReViveI/O increases the latency of network messages because the server PDD does not send pack-
ets until after the next checkpoint. In practice, back-end database servers running TPC-C class
applications are not particularly latency bound. Adding tens of ms to each transaction to support
recovery is tolerable.
However, we tune TCP in two ways. First, since packets now take longer to be acknowledged,
we increase the sliding window [77] that buffers yet-to-be-acknowledged packets. There is no danger
of buffer overflow because TCP throttles packet sending as a buffer becomes full. Second, since the
server PDD sends packets after checkpoints, the packet round trip time becomes more variable.
This additional variability disrupts TCP’s flow control mechanism. To solve this problem, the
server PDD does not send all the packets as fast as it can after a checkpoint; instead, it smooths
out the traffic.
ReViveI/O’s impact on computation, memory, and disk accesses may also affect application
throughput. Consider computation and memory accesses. For each output request, ReViveI/O
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requires an initial write and a later read to the Memory Buffer (Figure 2.4). For network I/O, the
data written/read is only a pointer to the socket buffer; the actual packet payload is retained in
the sliding window elsewhere in memory. For disk I/O, the data written/read is the block data
and metadata (Buffer), or the mapping only (Rename). For Rename, the mapping is also written
to the NVRAM at checkpoints. In addition, the PDD executes bookkeeping code to manage the
Memory Buffer.
For disk accesses, Buffer performs two disk writes per write request, although only one is in
the critical path (Figure 2.4-(b)). The one in the critical path is fast because the disk buffer is
written sequentially, and it can be a small, fast disk. Rename performs two writes on the same
disk per request: one for the data and one for the new mapping (Figure 2.4-(c)). The first one is
in the critical path; the second one can be merged with other updates of mappings from the same
checkpoint interval. In addition, Rename may require periodic disk block compaction.
Recovery Latency
The latency of a recovery depends on the type of fault. Consider first an MR fault. Figure 2.5
shows a ReVive recovery time-line from [61], for the worst MR fault: the permanent loss of one
node at a checkpoint. The latency numbers assume a 100 ms checkpoint interval. On top of the
ReVive recovery, the thick up-arrows show the three actions performed by ReViveI/O.
Immediately after fault detection, ReViveI/O resets the I/O devices, namely network card and
disk. This operation kills any ongoing DMA, which could overwrite the data being restored in the
rollback. This operation is quick — 1 ms or less. It is also device dependent: it involves writing to
a special I/O port to reset the network card, and sending a signal to reset the disk controller. It
does not require any slow disk access.
After the memory state has been rolled back to the checkpoint, ReViveI/O re-initializes the
device drivers (Figure 2.5). They have been left in an inconsistent state relative to the reset
devices. This operation involves updating data structures in memory such as buffers and pointers,
and bringing back the device driver’s configuration parameters. It typically takes 10 ms or less.
Finally, after application execution has resumed, ReViveI/O performs in the background all the
output operations needed to bring the I/O state to the checkpoint immediately preceding the fault.
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Figure 2.5: Recovery time-line for the permanent loss of one node at a checkpoint. ReViveI/O
actions are shown with thick arrows.
Performing all these operations is easy. Indeed, for Buffer, the rolled-back Memory Buffer has an
accurate record of all such operations. For Rename, the Memory Buffer has the record for the
network operations, while the NVRAM has the record of the disk mappings to save. Performing
these actions degrades the machine’s performance for tens of ms, but does not make it unavailable.
Overall, the three ReViveI/O-related recovery actions negligibly add to the unavailable time
and keep the fault transparent to the database.
Consider now an NMR fault. All currently-executing transactions abort and the system is
typically rebooted. Before the database can use its own recovery mechanisms, ReViveI/O brings
the disk to the state at the checkpoint immediately preceding the fault. This is done as follows:
for Buffer, the disk output information is recovered from the disk buffer area; for Rename, the
disk mappings are recovered from the NVRAM. The latency of performing these actions is much
smaller than the time required for rebooting or for the database to recover. Therefore, ReViveI/O
again adds negligibly to the unavailable time.
Finally, a second fault may occur while recovering. If ReVive can recover the memory state,
ReViveI/O re-executes the three actions shown in Figure 2.5. Otherwise, ReViveI/O brings the
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disk to a consistent state after reboot as just described.
2.3.4 Limitations
ReViveI/O has several applicability limitations. First, it is not applicable to latency-critical work-
loads, such as those with user interaction through graphics, keyboards, or other devices.
ReViveI/O relies on system-level code to intercept I/O requests, buffer them, and perform the
operations later. This approach rules out, as they are currently implemented, user-level I/O and
I/O co-processors such as TCP Oﬄoad Engines (TOEs). User-level I/O relies on user libraries to
perform I/O, eliminating kernel involvement. For example, uncached accesses from user mode to
the network interface send messages without involving the kernel. To be able to support schemes
similar to ReViveI/O, we would have to add a PDD component to the user libraries
TOEs implement TCP operations in hardware. The kernel is not involved in performing the
low-level operations in packet handling. Again, to support schemes similar to ReViveI/O, we would
have to modify the TOE hardware to perform the PDD operation, namely buffer the packet for
later issue. We would also have to synchronize the processor and the TOE at checkpoints.
We feel that, while user-level I/O and TOEs are interesting alternatives, they are still new
technologies with poor standardization and, as a result, are hard to maintain in large server in-
stallations. The standard software TCP solution that ReViveI/O supports is overwhelmingly the
most popular one.
2.4 Implementation Aspects
We have implemented a ReViveI/O prototype on a multiprocessor server with two 1.5 GHz AMD
Athlon processors, 1.2 Gbytes of memory, two 80-Gbyte IDE disks, and a 1 Gbit ethernet card.
One of the two disks is used as a disk buffer. The server runs Linux 2.4. The PDD is about
2,000 lines of C code for the disk and 2,000 for the network. The DDs, the Linux kernel, and the
applications remain unmodified.
Note that our server does not have ReVive hardware. Consequently, when needed, we simulate
its effect. Specifically, to test recovery, we pretend that a fault occurs immediately after a checkpoint
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and, therefore, the memory state rolls back instantly. ReViveI/O can then proceed with resetting
the devices, re-initializing the DDs and issuing all the buffered outputs. Since the memory state
recovery and the I/O state recovery are conveniently decoupled (Figure 2.5), we can test the
correctness of the I/O-related recovery without memory-checkpointing hardware. Under fault-free
conditions, we do not model ReVive. However, in Section 2.6.3, we estimate the combined overhead
and availability of ReVive and ReViveI/O.
Except for the ReVive support, we have thoroughly tested the prototype under many workload
conditions (e.g., heavy disk writes, frequent small messages, or bulk data transmission) and restart
scenarios (e.g., DMA in progress or many pending I/O requests). We also injected different faults
that allowed us to test most software paths. In the following, we outline some implementation
aspects.
2.4.1 Support for Disk I/O
ReViveI/O can be designed for disks accessed through a file system or as raw devices. In our
prototype, we use a file system. Figure 2.6 expands Figure 2.2 showing the interface between
kernel, PDD, and disk DD [7] for Buffer and Rename. The modules in shaded pattern are those
added for ReViveI/O: PDD, Memory Buffer, disk buffer or rename area, and NVRAM.
In a conventional system, a read request causes a buffer cache access. If a miss occurs, the
low-level DD satisfies the request. In a write, a block is allocated in the buffer cache if it is not
already there. The block is updated and marked dirty. Sometime later, the kernel writes it to disk.
With ReViveI/O, such dirty block writes are directed to the PDD. As indicated before, the
PDD buffers the information and commits it after the next checkpoint. Although individual DMA
operations (e.g., setup, execution, postprocessing) performed by the low-level DD may not be
idempotent, disk writes at the PDD level are idempotent because the PDD triggers these low-level
operations as an indivisible operation.
The Memory Buffer is sized based on the machine’s total disk bandwidth and the checkpoint
interval. The same applies to the NVRAM except that the bandwidth is per disk, since ReViveI/O
has one NVRAM per disk. For example, a 100 MB/s disk array in a 100 ms checkpoint interval
can consume 10 MB. Consequently, for Buffer, a 20 MB Memory Buffer and a 20 MB disk buffer
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Figure 2.6: Interface between kernel, PDD, and disk DD for Buffer (a) and Rename (b).
area suffice. For this update rate, Rename generates about 20 KB of mappings per checkpoint
interval. Consequently, for Rename, a 20 MB disk rename area, 40 KB Memory Buffer, and 40 KB
NVRAM suffice. Since the checkpoint operation takes about 1 ms [61], an NVRAM built out of
battery-backed SRAM has sufficient bandwidth (∼100 MB/s [76]) to load these 20 KB mappings
during a checkpoint.
2.4.2 Support for Network I/O
The kernel does not use the usual interface (e.g., eth0). Instead, it uses the virtual interface
provided by the network PDD (say, veth0). The data structure passed between the kernel and the
network DD is the socket buffer, which contains the length of the packet, a pointer to the packet,
and other fields. When the kernel passes a socket buffer to the PDD, a pointer to it is copied to
the Memory Buffer. We copy only the pointer to reduce overhead. After the checkpoint, the socket
buffer is passed to the network DD.
When an input packet arrives at the network card, the appropriate handler is triggered in the
network DD, which in turn calls the netif rx function in the kernel to process the packet. TCP
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Workload Description I/O
RandomWrite Repeatedly write blocks of a given size to disk. The writes are Disk
Micro- synchronous and directed to random locations. Size can be set.
Benchmarks SequentialWrite Like RandomWrite but writes are directed to sequential locations. Disk
Iperf [32] Repeatedly send messages of a given size. Size can be set. Network
Throughput TPC-C-like 32 warehouses, 30 remote clients, no think time, Disk and
oriented on Oracle 9.0.2 400-Mbyte database buffer, and 4-Kbyte blocks network
Latency WebStone 2.5 Memory resident, variable number of remote clients, no think time, Network
bound with Apache 2.0 85 HTML documents of 100 KB on average
Table 2.1: Workloads used in the evaluation. We use the term “TPC-C-like” because compliance
with the specification is not fully checked.
would get confused if the kernel sent a packet through veth0 and received the reply from eth0.
Consequently, the DD call is routed through a netif rx function in a special library that changes
the device field of the socket buffer to veth0. Neither DD nor kernel are modified.
2.5 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate the three schemes of Table 2.2. Of the ReViveI/O approaches, we select Buffer for
evaluation. NoRollback is the unmodified server, which has no provision for I/O undo/redo. Stall
is a scheme for disk I/O similar to Masubuchi et al. [47, 48]. In Stall, there is no data buffering;
requesting processes are not notified of output I/O completion until the next checkpoint.
Scheme Description
Buffer ReViveI/O approach. Supports I/O undo/redo
for disk & network I/O.
NoRollback Unmodified server. No provision for I/O undo/redo.
Stall Output I/O blocks until next checkpoint. Scheme for
disk I/O only. Similar to Masubuchi et al. [47, 48].
Table 2.2: Schemes evaluated.
We run the workloads of Table 2.1: a throughput-oriented one (TPC-C on Oracle 9.0.2), a
latency-bound one (WebStone [83] on the Apache server [1]), and several microbenchmarks.
We experiment with 20-240 ms checkpoint intervals. For each checkpoint interval, we set the
TCP sliding window size to buffer all unacknowledged packets at the 1 Gbit ethernet bandwidth,
and the Memory Buffer size to hold all the data that can be written to disk. For 80 ms intervals,
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this is 12 MB for the sliding window and 8 MB for the buffer. The ratio is the same for the other
intervals.
2.6 Evaluation
To evaluate our ReViveI/O prototype, we measure its overhead in fault-free execution (Section 2.6.1)
and the latency of fault recovery (Section 2.6.2). Then, we project the impact of combining Re-
ViveI/O and ReVive (Section 2.6.3).
2.6.1 Execution Overhead
Disk I/O Microbenchmarks
The RandomWrite and SequentialWrite microbenchmarks test worst-case disk I/O conditions.
They consist of a loop that synchronously writes blocks of a given size to disk. Consequently, the
disk is constantly busy. In our server, one disk can support up to 32 Mbytes/s of write throughput,
while the other (used as disk buffer) up to 36 Mbytes/s. With such hardware, Figure 2.7 shows the
resulting system throughput as a function of the size of the blocks written. We consider 20 and
160 ms checkpoint intervals.
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Figure 2.7: Disk I/O throughput for random and sequential synchronous writes.
We see that the various overheads of Buffer (Section 2.3.3) do not reduce throughput relative
to NoRollback under heavy disk write traffic. In fact, Buffer’s throughput is slightly higher than
23
NoRollback’s. The reason is that a write request in Buffer returns as soon as the data is written to
the faster disk sequentially, rather than to the other disk randomly (RandomWrite) or sequentially
(SequentialWrite).
The checkpoint interval size has little effect on Buffer. The reason is that PDD operations have
only tiny overhead. Finally, Stall delivers a very low throughput; effectively, Stall manages only a
single synchronous write per thread per checkpoint.
Network I/O Microbenchmark
The Iperf microbenchmark measures the maximum TCP bandwidth. Figure 2.8 shows the sustained
throughput as a function of the message size for two cases: our server sends messages to one client
(Unidirectional) and both client and server send messages to each other (Bidirectional). The case
where the client sends messages to the server is similar to Unidirectional — messages have the same
Round Trip Time (RTT) because the server delays all packets, including ACKs. In this experiment,
Stall does not apply.
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Figure 2.8: Uni- and bi-directional throughput between one client and the server over 1 Gbit
ethernet.
We see that, under these extreme conditions, Buffer lowers the throughput relative to NoRoll-
back. This is due to PDD overheads (Section 2.3.3) and suboptimal TCP operation in a high-
bandwidth, high-latency network. However, the throughput reduction is modest: it ranges from
5% with a 20 ms interval to less than 20% with 160 ms.
Finally, Buffer also increases packet RTT. The resulting impact on the response time depends
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on the application. The impact is tolerable in applications where the server performs substantial
work or where the communication pattern involves bulk data transmission. We consider this issue
next.
Throughput-Oriented Workload: TPC-C + Oracle
This workload is typical of back-end database servers. The major concern is not response time, but
maintaining high throughput. Individual transactions can take significant time, as they typically
perform disk I/O in the server. In Buffer, this workload exercises both disk and network PDDs.
Figure 2.9 shows the average TPC-C throughput with different schemes and checkpoint intervals
normalized to that in NoRollback2. The throughput of our moderately tuned NoRollback setup is
1561 transactions per minute and its average response time is 612 ms. The figure shows data for
Stall, and for Buffer with disk PDD only and with disk plus network PDDs. To minimize errors, we
report conditions of the first 10-minute interval after the database is warmed up and the throughput
becomes steady. During that period, we take a measurement every 30 seconds. The figure shows
the mean and standard deviation of such measurements.
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Figure 2.9: Transaction throughput with different schemes and checkpoint intervals normalized to
NoRollback. The experiments run with 30 remote clients.
Consider Stall first. If we can only tolerate a 5% reduction in throughput, none of the checkpoint
2Throughput is given in New Order transactions per minute; response time is for New Order transactions as well.
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intervals shown is acceptable. In contrast, Buffer keeps the throughput reduction within 1% up
to 120 ms checkpoint intervals. Note that for checkpoint intervals above 120 ms, the throughput
reduction comes mainly from network PDD overhead. Interestingly, the average response time does
not degrade as we increase the checkpoint interval. In fact, it goes down slightly, decreasing to 590
ms by the time we use 240 ms checkpoint interval. The reason is that long intervals reduce the
transaction rate, which in turn diminishes disk contention.
We have repeated the Buffer experiments for different numbers of clients and obtained similar
results. Figure 2.10 shows the normalized throughput for a range of checkpoint intervals for 60 and
90 clients. Each bar is normalized to NoRollback for the same number of clients. As we increase
the number of clients (i.e., more transactions overlap in time), the delay incurred by the network
PDD is less visible and, therefore, long checkpoint intervals become more tolerable.
Overall, we conclude that in throughput-oriented workloads like TPC-C, and for 20–120 ms
checkpoint intervals, our proposed Buffer scheme induces very small throughput reductions of up
to 1%. In such workloads, the progress of transaction processing typically depends on the rate
of synchronous writes issued by the database log-writer process. Our Buffer scheme affects such
progress minimally.
Latency-Bound Workload: WebStone + Apache
In this workload, multiple remote clients read HTML documents that are memory-resident in the
server. Each transaction involves establishing the connection with a three-way handshake, reading
a file, and closing the connection. Transactions are short because there is no disk I/O — only the
network PDD is exercised. This workload simulates an interactive environment. Consequently, we
are interested in response time, measured as the time between requesting the connection until the
whole file is received.
Figure 2.11 shows the response time for different numbers of clients and checkpoint intervals.
The figure is organized in numbers of clients. In each group, there are bars for NoRollback, and for
Buffer with different checkpoint intervals. Since there is no disk I/O, the Stall scheme is irrelevant.
To obtain the data, we run each experiment for 10 minutes, with the server at 100% CPU usage.
We see that the response time quickly increases with the checkpoint interval. With a checkpoint
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Figure 2.10: Normalized transaction throughput as a function of the checkpoint interval for different
numbers of clients.
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Figure 2.11: Response time for different numbers of clients and checkpoint intervals.
interval T , the response time should increase by 2× T , since we add T to establish the connection
and T to get the data (Recall from Section 2.3.3 that the PDD smooths out outgoing messages).
This is what we observe with 100 clients. For more than 300 clients and T ≥ 80ms, contention
causes larger increases in the response time.
According to [56], it is acceptable to add up to 100 ms to the response time of a transaction.
Consequently, our Buffer scheme can be used in the web server measured, as long as the checkpoint
interval is ∼50 ms or shorter.
2.6.2 Latency of Fault Recovery
To recover from an MR fault, our schemes perform three actions (Section 2.3.3): reset the devices,
re-initialize the DDs and, in the background, perform all the buffered output operations to bring
the I/O state to the checkpoint immediately preceding the fault. While our prototype server lacks
ReVive hardware, we can measure the recovery latency of ReViveI/O as discussed in Section 2.4.
We have measured the latency of each part of the recovery for Buffer, and listed average values
in Table 2.3. From the table, we see that device reset and DD re-initialization are quick. Note that,
to re-initialize the disk DD, we do not need to access the disk to get information such as the number
of cylinders and the sector size; these parameters are obtained from the recovered memory. Finally,
the third operation takes tens of ms, but it is executed in the background. Overall, compared to
the ReVive recovery latency (Figure 2.5), ReViveI/O adds negligible recovery overhead.
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Operation Duration
Disk Network
Reset device 1 ms 15 µs
Re-initialize device driver 10 ms 60 µs
Re-issue operations in background ∼ T ∼ T
Table 2.3: Latencies of the operations needed to recover from an MR fault. T is the checkpoint
interval.
If the fault is NMR, Buffer only needs to re-issue the buffered output operations. This activity
takes several seconds, as Buffer has to read data and mappings from the disk buffer. Such latency is
negligible compared to the tens of minutes needed to reboot the server and run a database recovery
routine after this type of fault.
2.6.3 Combining ReVive and ReViveI/O: Performance Overheads and
Availability
We would like to estimate the impact of combining ReViveI/O and ReVive. In [61], ReVive was
evaluated for a checkpoint interval T = 100 ms, where each checkpoint took 1 ms. ReVive induced
a 6% execution overhead.
We model ReVive as inducing a c = 1 ms overhead every checkpoint, and a fixed r = 5%
overhead for the period between checkpoints, independently of T . Therefore, the throughput
reduction factor induced by ReVive is f = c+(T−c)×rT . The response time increase due to ReVive
is ts × f1−f , where ts is the time that the transaction spends executing in the server.
Figure 2.12 takes the impact of Buffer on TPC-C throughput (Section 2.6.1) and WebStone
response time (Section 2), and adds the estimated effect of ReVive. We can see that a throughput-
oriented workload such as TPC-C keeps the throughput reduction at 7% or below for checkpoint
intervals between 60 and 120 ms. Most of the overhead is due to ReVive. On the other hand,
the response time increase in a latency-bound workload such as WebStone is practically all due to
ReViveI/O. The increase is 2× T , where T is the checkpoint interval (Section 2).
To complete the picture, we compare the availability of ReVive+Buffer and NoRollback. For
the former, we assume that MR and NMR faults are independent and distributed exponentially. As
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(left) and the response time of WebStone (right).
a result, the availability of ReVive+Buffer is 1− MTTRMRMTBFMR −
MTTRNMR
MTBFNMR
. We estimate MTTRNMR
as 5 minutes for machine reboot plus 5 minutes for database recovery [49]. We set MTTRMR to
1 second [61]. For NoRollback, all faults have the same MTTR, namely MTTRNMR.
Figure 2.13 shows the unavailability as a function of MTBFMR. Note that both axes in the
figure are logarithmic. For ReVive+Buffer, we show two curves: 1:100 assumes thatMTBFNMR =
100 ×MTBFMR, while 1:1000 assumes that MTBFNMR = 1000 ×MTBFMR. For NoRollback,
both curves are practically the same, and we show only one.
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Figure 2.13: Unavailability as a function of the MTBF of MR faults. The MTBF of NMR faults is
set to 100 or 1000 times the MTBF of MR faults (curves 1:100 and 1:1000, respectively).
The figure shows that ReVive+Buffer has much lower unavailability than NoRollback thanks
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to its tiny recovery latency for the more common MR faults. For example, for 1-week MTBFMR,
ReVive+Buffer (1:100) has an unavailability of ∼10−5, which corresponds to 99.999% availability,
while NoRollback has an unavailability of 0.001, which corresponds to 99.9% availability. Overall,
ReVive+Buffer’s unavailability is 86 and 375 times lower than NoRollback’s for 1:100 and 1:1000,
respectively.
In summary, ReVive+Buffer provides higher availability than conventional systems while deliv-
ering slightly lower throughput. We believe that, at least in the applications considered, reducing
downtime is much more important than achieving peak throughput while the machine is up.
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Chapter 3
Architecture-Aware Fine-Grain Body
Biasing for Within-Die Parameter
Variation
3.1 Introduction to Architecture-Aware Fine-Grain Body
Biasing
As high-performance processors move into sub-65 nm technologies, designers face the major road-
block of parameter variation — the deviation of Process, Voltage, and Temperature (PVT [6])
values from nominal specifications. Variation makes designing processors harder because they have
to work under a range of parameter values.
Variation is induced by several fundamental effects. Process variation is caused by the inability
to precisely control the fabrication process at small-feature technologies. It is a combination of
systematic effects [20, 58, 74], e.g., due to lithographic lens aberrations, and random effects [5],
e.g., due to dopant density fluctuations. Voltage variation is mostly due to IR drops resulting
from non-ideal voltage distribution. Finally, temperature variation is largely due to different level
of activity across the chip. All these variations become harder to tolerate as technology scales to
minute feature sizes.
A key process parameter subject to variation is the transistor threshold voltage (Vth). Vth is
especially important because it directly impacts major architectural characteristics of the chip.
Specifically, Vth variations affect the speed and leakage power of a transistor [78] and, in aggregate
form, of the whole chip. Moreover, Vth is also a function of temperature, which increases its
variability.
A recently-proposed technique to mitigate Vth variation within a chip is Fine-Grain Body Bi-
asing (FGBB) [81]. FGBB applies different body biases to different sections of the chip, which we
call Cells. A body bias is a voltage applied between the source or drain of a transistor and its
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substrate, effectively changing the transistor’s Vth [78]. Depending on the polarity of the voltage
applied, Vth increases or decreases. If it increases, a leaky transistor becomes less leaky but slower;
if it decreases, a slow transistor becomes faster but leakier. Body Biasing (BB) had already been
applied chip-wide to increase a chip’s frequency, reduce its leakage power, or for other purposes
(e.g., [40, 50, 81]). However, Tschanz et al. [81] are the first to apply it to multiple sections of the
chip separately, to improve its effectiveness in the presence of within-die Vth variation.
In Tschanz et al.’s design, the chip has 21 cells. They are rectangular slabs abutting each other.
The authors reduce the Vth of slow cells and increase the Vth of leaky cells. The result is a chip
with improved frequency-leakage operation. However, there is no justification of the cells’ shape or
number.
In this study, we claim that there are major advantages to using architecture awareness in
selecting the cells in FGBB. Cells should mostly follow the shapes of architectural modules, such
as execution units or caches — an approach that we term Architecture-Aware FGBB (AA-FGBB).
The rationale is that architectural functionality is the main determinant of the temperature and
the type of critical path (memory versus logic) in a section of the chip; these characteristics in turn
determine the optimal BB to apply in that section to mitigate variation.
The main contribution of this work is to introduce and demonstrate this new idea. A second
contribution is the development of a novel, parameterized model of Vth variation within the chip.
In the process, this work shows that computer architecture plays an essential role in mitigating
parameter variation in small-feature technology.
We present results based on simulating batches of 200 chips with variation. AA-FGBB enables
35% of the chips to work at the highest frequency, compared to only 18% with advanced conventional
FGBB — potentially increasing each improved chip’s value by 50%. AA-FGBB also reduces the
leakage of the chips by 40%, compared to 25% with advanced conventional FGBB. Finally, compared
to the original batch of chips, AA-FGBB enables 82% of the chips to work at the top two frequencies
rather than only 14%, potentially increasing each improved chip’s value two or three times.
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3.2 Background
Variation can be die-to-die (D2D) or within die (WID). We focus on the latter, which offers more
challenges and opportunities for computer architecture solutions. In addition, in the context of
BB, D2D Vth variation can be treated as an offset to WID variation. We consider temperature (T )
variation. However, due to the complexity of the problem, we do not consider voltage (V ) variation
in this study. Next, we review transistor leakage, gate delay, and BB.
3.2.1 Transistor Leakage and Gate Delay
Transistor leakage and gate delay are a function of two key varying parameters, namely Vth and T .
Specifically, a transistor’s subthreshold leakage current is:
Ileak ∝ T 2e−qVth(T )/kT (3.1)
where Vth decreases by 2.5 mV/K as temperature increases [39]. From the equation, as Vth de-
creases, leakage goes up. Moreover, as T increases, leakage quickly goes up, both because of its
dependence on T and because Vth goes down. Figure 3.1 shows the dependence of Ileak on Vth and
T , where the leakage current is normalized by Ileak at Vth = 150 mV and 100 oC. From this plot, it
is clear that the temperature variation has more impact on the leakage than the process variation.
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The delay of an inverter gate is given by the alpha-power model [67] as:
Tg ∝ LV
µ(T )(V − Vth(T ))α
(3.2)
where α is typically 1.3 and µ is the mobility of carriers (µ(T ) ∝ T−1.5). As Vth decreases, V −Vth
increases and the gate becomes faster. As T increases, V −Vth(T ) increases, but µ(T ) decreases [39].
Figure 3.2 plots the switching frequency for various temperature and Vth. Contrary to the leakage,
the frequency is more affected by the process variation than the temperature variation.
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3.2.2 Body Biasing
Body Biasing (BB) a transistor involves applying a voltage between its source or drain and
substrate to alter the subthreshold leakage current [78]. In Forward BB (FBB), the voltage polarity
is such that Vth decreases. The result is a faster and leakier transistor. In Reverse BB (RBB), the
voltage polarity is such that Vth increases, creating a slower, less leaky transistor. These properties
make BB a useful architecture knob, although it has been little explored.
BB’s static application does not have any noticeable performance overhead [54]. It adds certain
complexity to the design, as triple wells are required [43] and wires need to be added to transmit
the bias current [54]. The area overhead is modest [54], as we discuss next. Overall, the complexity
and cost are manageable, and many papers have recently appeared with circuits benefiting from
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FBB, RBB, or both (e.g., [40, 50]).
Fine-Grain Body Biasing (FGBB) is our term to refer to applying different BB to different
sections of the chip. We call such sections Cells. The only published work on FGBB is that of
Tschanz et al. [81], who describe an experimental chip with 21 rectangular cells. They use it to
mitigate WID Vth variation: cells with slow transistors are made faster with FBB; cells with leaky
ones are made less leaky with RBB.
Uses of BB and FGBB. While no commercial processor uses BB (to our knowledge), there are
several proposed uses. One use of BB is to save dynamic power [46, 54]. By applying FBB, we
can reduce Vth, which in turn enables a reduction of V for the same chip frequency (Eq. (3.2)).
For a range of FBB, the result is a dynamic power reduction that is larger than the accompanying
increase in leakage power, thereby reducing total power.
A second use of BB is to reduce Die-to-Die (D2D) process variation [6, 81]. Different dies from
the same wafer run at different frequencies and leak a different amount. Applying chip-wide BB
can help push chips into acceptable ranges of frequency and leakage. Specifically, RBB is applied
to fast and high-leakage chips to reduce leakage; FBB is applied to slow and low-leakage chips to
increase speed.
Finally, as indicated above, Tschanz et al. [81] use FGBB to reduce WID variability. The result
is an even better frequency-leakage operation of the chip.
This study builds on Tschanz’s work. We apply a computer architecture perspective to FGBB,
arguing that FGBB should be architecture-aware. Also, we present a new model of WID Vth
variation and analyze FGBB’s impact in depth.
Circuitry for BB and FGBB. BB requires enhancing the manufacturing process with a triple
well process [43], adding power lines for the body bias voltage, and adding critical-path circuits to
calibrate the BB [54, 81]. The area overhead of the power lines vary a lot, depending on layout
conditions. Such overhead can be up to 8% of the area in hard-to-route areas of control logic, but
it is much smaller in memory areas [68]. For the chip as a whole, the area overhead is modest.
Perhaps as a result, BB papers do not dwell on such overhead [54, 81]. Instead, they focus on
the overhead of the calibration circuits. Each cell has at least one circuit that is representative
of the critical paths in the cell. Using a mechanism similar to Razor [18] on that representative
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circuit, [54, 81] determine the frequency that the transistors in that cell can support (Figure 3.3).
Based on it, they can determine the desirable static BB to apply to the cell. We note that each cell
in Tschanz et al. [81] only has a single critical path; consequently, the sample used to calibrate the
cell is trivially representative of the cell. In their experimental chips, [54, 81] report a 2% chip area
overhead for all these circuits at 150nm. An optimized design of these circuits in a high-volume
processor chip at 45nm technology (which we are targeting) will have little area overhead.
Clock signal
@ target frequency Sample critical path
Phase
detector
Bias
generator
To the rest
of the cell
Figure 3.3: Block diagram of a circuitry that adjusts body bias.
3.3 WID Vth Variation and its Impact
From an architectural perspective, Vth variation is of key importance: it directly affects a chip’s
leakage and frequency. The WID variation of Vth is impacted by both systematic and random
effects [5]. Limitations of the lithography and other manufacturing processes introduce systematic
variations in Vth, which repeat across dies. Typically, such variations exhibit a spatial structure
with a certain scale of parameter changes over the two-dimensional space [20, 58, 74]. On the other
hand, a variety of materials effects, most notably changes in the dopant density of the channel [5],
introduce random variations in Vth. Such variations have a different profile in each die and are in
effect noise superimposed on the systematic variation. Since there is no existing model of WID Vth
variation, we develop a new one.
3.3.1 A Model of WID Vth Variation
Rather than building the model bottom-up, starting from largely unknown random and systematic
Vth components, we build it top-down, relying on one accepted assumption and on experimental
data from Friedberg et al. [20]. The resulting model does not explicitly separate systematic and
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random effects. Instead, it is used by choosing values for three intuitive parameters: mean µ,
standard deviation σ, and range φ.
The model treats Vth at position ~x in the chip as a random variable Vth(~x) that follows a normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, regardless of ~x. This is consistent with current
assumptions [19, 53]. To capture systematic variation, we use an appropriate spatial distribution of
Vth. For that, we assume a correlation between Vth(~x) and Vth(~y) that depends only on the distance
between ~x and ~y, and not on the position or direction. We make this assumption of uniformity
and isotropy in this initial work for simplicity. We can thus write the correlation function of Vth(~x)
and Vth(~y) as ρ(r), where r = |~x− ~y| (Appendix B.1). While ρ(0) = 1 (i.e., totally correlated) by
definition, we set ρ(∞) = 0 (i.e., totally uncorrelated) because two infinitely separated points have
independent Vth when we only consider WID variation.
To determine how ρ(r) changes from ρ(0) = 1 to ρ(∞) = 0 as r increases, we use the Spherical
model [14, 36]. This model is very similar to the correlation function experimentally measured by
Friedberg et al. [20] for the WID variation of gate length. Our rationale is that gate length variation
is the main determinant of systematic Vth variation. Figure 3.4 shows the chosen function ρ(r),
while Appendix B.1 gives its analytic expression. At a finite distance φ called range, the function
converges to zero.
 0
1
 0 φ r
(r)ρ
Figure 3.4: Correlation between the Vth at two points as a function of the distance r between them.
Intuitively, our assumptions imply that the Vth of a transistor is highly correlated to the Vth of
those in its immediate vicinity. The correlation decreases linearly with distance at small distances.
Then, it decreases more slowly. At distance φ, there is no significant correlation between two
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transistors’ Vth.
We will explore different values of φ and σ/µ. We give φ as a fraction of the chip’s width. A
high φ implies that large sections of the chip are correlated with each other; the opposite is true
for a low φ. The experiments by Friedberg et al. [20] found φ ≈ 0.5.
Figure 3.5: Randomly generated Vth distribu-
tion in a chip for φ = 0.5.
Figure 3.6: Randomly generated Vth distribu-
tion in a chip for φ = 0.1.
As an illustration, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show a chip’s Vth distribution for φ = 0.5 and φ = 0.1,
respectively, as generated by the geoR statistical package [64] of R [62]. We set σ/µ = 0.12. In
the φ = 0.5 case, we discern large spatial features, whereas in the φ = 0.1 one, the features are
small. A distribution without any correlation (φ = 0) contains only random variation and appears
as white noise.
3.3.2 Impact on Chip-Level Behavior
Leakage Power
We take our Vth distribution and integrate the leakage equation (Eq. (3.1)) over all the transistors
in the chip. The result is the total leakage current in the chip. Let us call Pleak and Ileak the
chip leakage power and current under Vth variation, and P 0leak and I
0
leak the same parameters when
there is no Vth variation. Appendix B.1 shows that:
Pleak/P
0
leak = Ileak/I
0
leak = e
(qσ/kT )2/2 (3.3)
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which says that the increase in the chip’s leakage power and current due to Vth variation depends
on the standard deviation σ of Vth’s variation. Figure 3.7 plots the relative power as a function of
σ. It increases rapidly as σ goes up.
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Figure 3.7: Relative leakage power in the chip as a function of Vth’s σ, for T=25 oC and µ=150mV.
Section 3.2.1 indicated that, as T goes up, leakage increases rapidly. Additionally, Eq. (3.3)
shows that the ratio Pleak/P 0leak decreases with T . Variation is relatively less harmful at high T .
Chip Frequency
Given that Vth is normally distributed, Appendix B.1 shows that the gate delay of Eq. (3.2)
is also normally distributed. Assuming that a critical path consists of ncp gates, and that a
modern processor chip has thousands of critical paths, Bowman et al. [8] compute the probability
distribution of the longest critical path max{Tcp}. This is the one that determines the processor
frequency. Then, we set the chip frequency to be 1/max{Tcp}.
Using this approach, we find that Vth’s σ determines the chip frequency. Figure 3.8 shows the
probability distribution of the chip frequency for different σ. The frequency is given relative to a
processor without Vth variation (F/F0). The figure shows that, as σ increases, (i) the mean chip
frequency decreases and (ii) the chip frequency distribution gets more spread out. In other words,
given a batch of chips, as σ increases, the mean frequency of the batch decreases and, at the same
time, individual chip’s frequency deviates more from the mean.
Appendix B.2 further develops the theory of D2D and WID variations under a constant tem-
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Figure 3.8: Probability distribution of the relative chip frequency as a function of Vth’s σ for
T=25 oC, µ=150mV, 12 FO4s in the critical path, and 10,000 critical paths.
perature.
Summary
We see that Vth’s σ directly affects chip leakage and frequency. As σ increases, chip leakage increases
rapidly, and chip frequency decreases in mean value and varies more. Therefore, Vth variation is
detrimental.
3.4 Architecture-Aware Fine-Grain Body Biasing (AA-FGBB)
Judicious application of FGBB can redress the problem of WID Vth variation. With FGBB, the
chip is divided into cells. Ignoring for the moment the effects of WID temperature variation, FGBB
applies reverse BB to cells that have low Vth. FGBB applies forward BB to cells that have high Vth.
The consequence is to lower the effective σ of Vth. Consequently, the resulting chip may increase
its frequency, reduce its leakage, or a combination of both.
The only previous work on FGBB [81] constructed the BB cells as rectangular slabs abutting
each other. Moreover, it applied BB to the chip at a constant temperature — therefore neglecting
the effect of temperature variation across the chip under load. This study presents a new approach.
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3.4.1 Rationale for Architecture Awareness
We claim that there are significant advantages to using architecture-aware BB cells — meaning
cells with shapes that largely match architectural modules such as caches, registers, or execution
units. We put forward two main reasons for this, namely (i) variations in temperature and (ii)
differences in the types of critical paths in logic and memory modules.
Temperature Effects
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) show that transistor leakage and gate delay are significantly affected by
temperature. At high temperature, transistors become vastly leakier and gates slower. Therefore,
it is more effective to construct BB cells composed of transistors that are at roughly the same
temperature. The reason is two-fold. First, the BB applied can be more accurately tuned to the
needs of the transistors in the cell. Second, it is more likely that the circuit that we choose to
calibrate the BB (Section 3.2.2) to apply to the rest of the cell be representative of the transistors
in the cell. On the other hand, a cell that includes both hot and cold transistors is unlikely to be
effectively body-biased.
It is well known that the spatial distribution of the temperature in a chip under load follows
the breakdown into architectural modules. For example, the execution unit is hot whereas the L2
cache is cold. Consequently, we propose organizing the chip into BB cells that follow the contours
of groups of hot and groups of cold architectural modules.
Critical Paths in Logic versus Memory
Different architectural modules have different types of critical paths. This is most obvious by
comparing logic blocks such as functional units to memory structures such as the L1 cache or TLB.
In the former, a critical path contains little wire and many, physically close gates; in the latter,
it has a lot of wire and few, physically separated gates. Specifically, in logic blocks, the critical
path in high-end processors is likely to be 8-16 FO4-equivalent gates [24, 27] connected by short
wires. In contrast, in memory structures such as the L1, the critical path is likely to be the circuit
that extends from a driver that drives a word line, through the word line, a pass transistor, the bit
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line, and then to the logic at the sense amplifier. This path is likely to determine the cycle time
in future high-frequency memory structures because it is hard to pipeline [13]. It is composed of
(approximately) three logic gates connected by long wires.
From a Vth variation point of view, these two critical paths differ dramatically. The transistors
in a logic path are many and physically close. Their large number enables a better averaging of
random Vth variation effects. Also, physical proximity makes them subject to the same systematic
Vth variation effect. On the other hand, the transistors in the memory path are few and distant from
each other. For example, for the L1 used in our experiments, the (manhattan) distance between
the gates at the two ends of the critical path is 0.55mm. Fewer transistors mean less averaging of
random Vth variations; farther distances imply better averaging of systematic Vth variations. In
addition, wires may also be affected by process variation; in this first study, however, we do not
consider wire variation.
From this discussion, it follows that a given BB application changes the frequency-leakage
operating point of a logic and a memory module differently. Consequently, given a cell with various
architectural modules at the same temperature, we partition it into two cells, one with the logic
and the other with the memory modules. For a similar reason, we also separate large memory
modules from small ones (Section 3.5.4).
Additional Considerations
There are additional considerations related to AA-FGBB. First, when applying it to L2, we could
decide not to use any forward BB in L2 — only use reverse BB wherever needed. The rationale is
that L2 paths are unlikely to be critical; they are likely to have enough timing slack to absorb Vth
variation effects. Avoiding forward BB limits leakage power. Since we want our experiments to be
conservative, we do not use this optimization.
Second, we still break down large architectural modules such as the L2 into multiple BB cells (of
rectangular shape). The reason is that a large module covers areas with wide-ranging Vth values.
Finally, we set the cell size between a maximum and a minimum value. The maximum size
is given by the φ parameter of our Vth model (Section 3.3.1). If the cell is much larger than a
circle of diameter φ, it is likely to contain multiple Vth “correlation regions” and, therefore, work
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suboptimally with a single BB value. In addition, it will be hard to find a representative critical
path for BB calibration.
The minimum size is given by the area overhead of setting up a cell. Such overhead is small,
as discussed in Section 3.2.2. In our evaluation (Section 3.5), the chip with the most BB cells has
cells of, on average, 1mm2 at 45nm. This area is large enough for us to neglect BB area overhead.
3.4.2 How to Apply AA-FGBB
We envision the chip manufacturer taking a batch of recently-fabricated chips and applying AA-
FGBB to them individually. His goal is to bring each chip to the best possible frequency-leakage
operating point before shipment. This process will fix the body biases of each chip, and is performed
after the chip is brought to appropriate temperature conditions. We suggest using a (conservative)
temperature map generated after running representative workloads. It may be too conservative to
bring the chip to a uniform, very high temperature (110 oC) as Tschanz et al. [81] do before applying
BB. The reason is that the overestimated leakage reduces the opportunity to apply forward BB to
increase frequency.
The chip designers have divided the chip into architecture-aware cells. In each cell, they have
inserted a few, uniformly-spaced critical path samples that will be used to calibrate the BB to
apply to the cell.
To apply AA-FGBB to a chip, we initially set a Target Frequency (F) for it. It can be a
fixed percentage of the Nominal Frequency (F0) of the batch, namely the frequency that would be
supported if there were no Vth variation. We feed F to the BB-calibrating circuitry in each cell of
the chip. The circuitry automatically times the few critical-path samples in the cell and, based on
the slowest one, sets the BB for the cell.
After all the cells in the chip have been body-biased, we measure the chip’s new frequency and
total power. If the latter is below a tolerable maximum value, we increase F ; otherwise we decrease
it. In either case, we loop back to recompute the BB for the cells. We repeat this loop multiple
times, decreasing ∆F until we find the highest possible frequency subject to the power constraint.
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3.5 Evaluation Methodology
We model batches of 200 processor chips, where each chip has its own personalized Vth map and
critical paths. The T map is common to all chips (although T is not constant).
3.5.1 Processor Chip Model
We model a high-performance processor chip at 45nm. For this, we took the Alpha 21364 chip
floor-plan, removed the router and I/O pads and added a large L2 cache as in [70]. Then, we scaled
it to 45nm using CACTI [69] and data from [42]. Finally, we put four such units on a chip, and
interconnected them with a wide snoopy bus. The resulting 132 mm2 chip is shown in Figure 3.9(a).
Each processor has a 64KB L1 I-cache, a 64KB L1 D-cache, and a private 2MB L2 cache.
(g) Arch144
(c) Grid64
(a) CMP with a detailed processor
(e) Arch16 (f) Arch64
(d) Grid144
L2 Cache
DCache
Bpred
FPReg
FPAdd
FPMul
DTB
ITB
LdSTQ
IntExec
IntRegFPMap
IntMap IntQFPQ
ICache
(b) Grid16
Figure 3.9: Multi-processor chip floor-plan used (a) and the partitioning of one processor
and its share of the bus into regular BB cells (b–d) or architecture-aware ones (e–g).
Chart (e) shows the five critical-path samples for one cell.
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3.5.2 Vth Variation Model
Table 3.1 shows some of the process parameters used, including those for our Vth model. We
target 6GHz, which we believe is realistic for 45nm. Unfortunately, there is no public-domain
information that can suggest the likely values for Vth σ/µ and φ. For σ/µ, the 1999 ITRS [33] gave
a design target of 0.06 for year 2005 (although no solution existed); however, the projection has
been discontinued since 1999. On the other hand, Kahng [37, 38] reckons that the ITRS variability
projections (for at least the gate-length parameter that he examines) are too optimistic. Rather
than the σ/µ = 0.03 for gate length reported by the ITRS, he wonders about possible 0.05 or 0.17
values. Consequently, in our experiments, we examine a Vth σ/µ ranging from 0.03 to 0.12, and
report the main results with 0.12 and 0.09.
Parameter Values
Technology: 45nm; Frequency: 6GHz; VDD: 1V
Vth: µ: 150mV at 100 oC
σ/µ: 0.03, 0.06, 0.09, 0.12
φ (fraction of chip’s width): 0.1, 0.2, 0.5
Number of grid cells per chip: 16, 64, or 144
Number of architectural cells per chip: 16, 64, or 144
Number of samples per cell: 5
Number of chips per batch: 200
Table 3.1: Process parameters used in the evaluation.
For φ, we examine values ranging from 10% of the chip’s width (short range of correlation) to
50% (long range). Since Friedberg et al.’s experiments [20] found that the gate-length parameter
had a range close to 0.5, we report the main results with φ=0.5.
To generate the personalized Vth map of a chip with a given σ and φ, we use the geoR statistical
package [64] of R [62]. We use a resolution of 1M points per chip. Each of our experiments uses a
batch of 200 chips that have a different Vth map with the same σ and φ.
3.5.3 T Variation Model
We use HotSpot 3.02 [70] to estimate temperatures. HotSpot uses the combined dynamic and static
energy dissipated. To estimate the dynamic energy, we use a cycle-accurate simulator of the chip
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architecture augmented with the dynamic energy models from Wattch [10] and Orion [82]. These
models are scaled to 45nm using technology projections from ITRS [34] except for frequency, since
we target 6GHz. To estimate the leakage energy, we use HotLeakage 1.0 [85], also scaled using
ITRS projections. The resulting leakage power is 19–39% of the total power, depending upon the
application.
To estimate the on-chip T map, we use the iterative approach of Su et al. [75]: the temperature
is estimated based on the current total power, the leakage power is estimated based on the current
temperature, and the leakage power is added to the total power. This is repeated until convergence.
Note that HotSpot also handles lateral heat conduction. In this way, we obtain the T map for one
workload. We repeat this process for all workloads, creating multiple T maps Ti. Then, we
conservatively build the final temperature map Tfinal that we use for the chips by setting, for each
chip coordinate (x, y), Tfinal(x, y) = maxi{Ti(x, y)}.
Figure 3.10: Temperature distribution of Tfinal(x, y) ( oC).
The applications executed are nine SPECint and ten SPECfp applications. A workload consists
of running four instances of the same application at a time, one on each core. We use the Ref input
set and run the codes for 1 billion instructions after discarding the first 1 billion instructions.
Looking at the resulting T map (Figure 3.10), we see that the maximum temperature reached in
the chip is 109 oC. The hottest module is always the integer queue. Other hot modules include the
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integer execution unit, load/store queue, integer register file and, for SPECfp, the FP execution
unit.
3.5.4 Critical Path Model
Bowman et al. [8] estimate that a high-performance processor at this technology has about 10,000
critical paths. We distribute these paths uniformly across the chip area except for the L2s — we
consider that the L2s do not have critical paths. As per Section 3.4.1, we build the critical paths
differently in different modules. In the logic modules (e.g., the execution unit), the critical path
delay is the delay of 12 close-by FO4 gates [24, 27]. For the memory modules, we use CACTI [69]
to determine the optimal memory subarray sizes, the critical paths, and their physical layout.
We distinguish two groups of structures: large memories (the two L1 caches) and small SRAM
structures (e.g., the register file). The latter are assumed to cycle at twice the frequency of the
former. The optimal subarray sizes are different in the two groups. In both cases, the critical path
stretches from a driver that drives a word line, through the word line, a pass transistor, the bit
line, and then to the logic at the sense amplifier. The critical path delay is the delay of three logic
gates in the layout described, plus the wire delay corresponding to half the width of the subarray
(word line) and the length of it (bit line).
The frequency supported by a chip is determined by the slowest of its 10,000 critical paths.
3.5.5 BB Environments Evaluated
We evaluate the environments of Table 3.2. We compare chips with Vth and T variation but no BB
(NoBB) to the same chips with FGBB. FGBB chips can be architecture aware (AA-FGBB) or non-
architecture aware (NAA-FGBB). The former are labeled Arch, while the latter are Grid. Their
name is extended with a suffix that indicates the number of BB cells that the full chip contains.
The Grid approach divides the chip into a grid of 16, 64, or 144 cells (one processor is shown in
Figures 3.9(b) to (d)). We choose rectangular cells for NAA-FGBB to follow the state-of-the-art,
as set by Tschanz et al.’s cells [81].
The Arch approach uses the same number of cells. However, it first separates groups of hot
modules from groups of cold ones. Then, in each of these groups, it separates logic, large memories,
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Name Vth BB? FGBB? Arch # of BB
Varies? Aware? Cells
NoVar N – – – –
NoBB Y N – – –
CoarseBB Y Y N N 1
Grid16 Y Y Y N 16
Grid64 Y Y Y N 64
Grid144 Y Y Y N 144
Arch16{T, T&CP} Y Y Y Y 16
Arch64{T, T&CP} Y Y Y Y 64
Arch144{T, T&CP} Y Y Y Y 144
Table 3.2: Chip environments evaluated.
and small memories (Figures 3.9(e) to (g)). For each number of cells, we have two schemes,
ArchT&CP and ArchT. Our proposal is ArchT&CP, and considers both temperature and type of
critical path variations. ArchT only considers temperature — since it does not care about the
module type, all modules are sampled with logic-type critical paths (12 FO4 gates), which reduces
BB effectiveness. We use this approach to assess the two components of AA-FGBB so that we can
keep the same cell shapes for both ArchT&CP and ArchT. Changing the cell shapes would cloud
the comparison.
As a reference, we also consider chips with a single BB cell (CoarseBB) and with no process-
induced Vth variation (NoVar). Note that NoVar’s Vth is not constant due to T variations.
Each cell has five uniformly-spaced critical path samples (Figure 3.9(e) shows them for one
cell). To set the BB, we estimate the cell frequency from the slowest of such samples. Although
the cells in the L2s have no critical paths, they still have critical-path samples copied from L1 cells.
We use them to determine the BB for L2 cells.
3.6 Evaluation
We first assess the effect of Vth variation. Then, we evaluate AA-FGBB either targeting fre-
quency increase or leakage reduction. Unless otherwise noted, all experiments use the T map of
Section 3.5.3.
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3.6.1 Characterizing Vth Variation
Figure 3.11 uses our Vth model to show chip frequency and chip leakage power as Vth variation
(measured in σ/µ) changes. For each value of σ/µ, the figure shows bars for three different φ. In
all cases, frequency and leakage are relative to the NoVar chip. The bands in the bars show the
variation across chips in the batch.
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Figure 3.11: Impact of Vth variation on the chip’s frequency and leakage power.
As Vth variation increases, the average frequency of the chip decreases and its average leakage
power goes up quickly. On average, at 0.12 variation, the frequency is 10% lower and the leakage
20% higher. Clearly, variation is undesirable.
The long bands show high variation across chips in the batch. This is due to the T variation.
At high T , a transistor becomes slower and leakier. Consequently, if transistors with very high Vth
happen to be in the hottest region of the chip, the chip is likely to have low frequency. On the
other hand, if many transistors with very low Vth are in the hottest area, the chip is likely to have
high leakage.
We see two main trends. First, variation across chips is higher in leakage power — since
leakage is exponential with T , an unfavorable Vth distribution can be really bad. Second, the
average frequency is lower for low φ. The reason is that, given a set of high-Vth transistors, if they
are uniformly spread out in the chip (low φ), there is a higher chance that some will be in the
hottest region of the chip, thus sinking the chip’s frequency. Therefore, with low φ, more chips will
be slow.
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We have repeated the experiments with the whole chip at constant T . In this case, there are
neither variation bands nor differences between different φ.
3.6.2 Impact of AA-FGBB on Frequency Binning
The most fruitful use of FGBB is to tune the chips in a batch so that they fall into desirable
frequency-leakage bins [6]. The goal is to place each chip at the highest possible frequency bin
where it still meets the power consumption constraint.
Acceptable Region
According to Tschanz et al. [81], the Acceptable Region for a chip is bounded by two conditions:
(i) the frequency should be higher than a given minimum value, and (ii) the sum of dynamic and
leakage power should be less than a given maximum value. These constraints are represented by a
horizontal and a slanted line, respectively, in a frequency-leakage plot. For our batch of 200 chips,
these lines are shown in Figure 3.12(a). The figure shows a scatter plot of the frequency and leakage
power of the chips, with the axes normalized to the NoVar environment (no process-induced Vth
variation). The slanted line has this shape because, as frequency increases, the dynamic power
increases linearly and, therefore, the amount of tolerable leakage power decreases linearly. Inside
the Acceptable Region, higher frequency is better.
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Figure 3.12: Frequency versus leakage power for a batch of chips under various schemes.
The experiments correspond to frequency binning for φ = 0.5 and σ/µ = 0.12.
Appendix B.3 justifies how we set the lines that bound the Acceptable Region in Figure 3.12(a).
In particular, the low frequency line is set to 0.85 times the frequency of the NoVar chip. This
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gives an approximate acceptable frequency range of 15%, which is similar to the 3.0–3.6 GHz range
of Intel’s Xeon family at 90nm [31]. Following the Xeon family, in our experiments, we divide the
area into four equally-spaced frequency bins. As a fraction of the NoVar frequency, the range of
the bins is: 0.850–0.887, 0.887–0.925, 0.925–0.962, and over 0.962.
Processors in the top bins fetch a hefty price premium. For example, Xeon Nocona processors
of 3.6, 3.4, and 3.2 GHz are priced about 3x, 2x, and 1.25x higher, respectively, than those of 3.0
GHz in November 2005 [84].
Chip Placement
Our goal is to move every chip to the Acceptable Region, at its maximum possible frequency. For
each chip, we apply the algorithm described in Section 3.4.2, which gives us the highest frequency
at which the chip still falls inside the Acceptable Region. Some chips leak too much even at the
lowest frequency of the region and, therefore, are discarded.
An understanding of how FGBB changes the frequency-leakage conditions of a chip enables the
algorithm of Section 3.4.2 to perform an efficient search for the optimal target frequency. Figure 3.13
takes the chip closest to the average frequency and leakage power in the batch of Figure 3.12(a)
and applies either Arch144T&CP or Grid144. For both schemes, we vary F from 1.0 times NoVar’s
frequency (where leakage power is high) to 0.85 times (where leakage power is low). At each step,
we plot the frequency and the leakage measured.
The figure shows that FGBB is able to modify the operating conditions of the chip significantly.
For example, Arch144T&CP can trade off a 14% frequency change for a 13x leakage power change.
Most importantly, the figure shows that Arch144T&CP is able to move the chip to a better region
than Grid144 — namely, to a higher frequency for the same leakage. Consequently, Arch144T&CP
should be able to place the processors in better bins. While the frequency boost may seem small
in the figure, it may have a significant revenue impact to a large vendor.
Results Obtained
We take the original batch of chips (Figure 3.12(a)) and apply our binning algorithm using the
CoarseBB, Grid144, Arch144T, or Arch144T&CP schemes. The resulting frequency-leakage scatter
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Figure 3.13: Changing the frequency and leakage power of a chip with Arch144T&CP or
Grid144.
plots are shown in Figure 3.12(b)–(e). The charts show that all the schemes are able to move
practically all the chips into the Acceptable Region, in the area close to the slanted line. However,
the schemes differ in how high the chips have been pushed. The AA-FGBB schemes are more
effective at reaching high frequencies.
The differences are best seen in Figure 3.14, which shows the fraction of the 200 chips that fall
in each frequency bin for the different schemes. Chart (a) corresponds to our experiment, while
(b) repeats it for σ/µ = 0.09.
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Figure 3.14: Frequency binning obtained by the different FGBB schemes, for φ = 0.5 and
either σ/µ = 0.12 (a) or σ/µ = 0.09 (b).
Chart (a) shows that the AA-FGBB schemes move many chips to the top bins. Specifically,
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while Grid144 only has 18% of the chips in the top bin, Arch144T&CP has 35% of them there. This
doubles the number of such chips, and represents a major revenue increase for the manufacturer —
chips in the top bin can be priced 50% higher than those in the next bin [84]. It also demonstrates
this study’s thesis that FGBB should be applied in an architecture-aware manner.
While Arch144T is more effective than Grid144, it is significantly inferior to our proposed
Arch144T&CP. Consequently, both temperature and type of critical path awareness contribute to
the gains.
Comparing Arch144T&CP to NoBB, we see the overall impact of AA-FGBB. While NoBB
only has 14% of the chips in the top two bins, Arch144T&CP has 82% of them there. This is an
even larger revenue differential, since chips in the top two bins can be priced 3x and 2x higher,
respectively, than those in the bottom bin [84].
Chart (b) shows that the trends are the same for σ/µ = 0.09. While the improvement as we
go from NoBB to Grid144 and then to Arch144T&CP is slightly smaller, it is still substantial.
Specifically, the number of chips in the top bin still changes from 37% in Grid144 to 56% in
Arch144T&CP. Consequently, our results are valid for more conservative variation values.
For completeness, Figure 3.15 repeats the experiments for small φ. Arch144T&CP still greatly
improves over Grid144.
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Figure 3.15: Frequency binning obtained for φ = 0.2 (a) or φ = 0.1 (b).
3.6.3 Impact of AA-FGBB on Leakage
Another use of FGBB is to try to reduce the leakage power of each chip in the batch without
changing its frequency. To do so, we take each chip in turn, measure its frequency, set the target
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frequency (F) to it, and apply FGBB. In reality, the chip ends up having a slightly different
frequency due to sampling inaccuracies and variation effects. Consequently, we may have to iterate
a few times with slightly different F .
Figure 3.16 shows how the original frequency-leakage scatter plot (NoBB) changes when we
apply the algorithm using the CoarseBB, Grid144, Arch144T, or Arch144T&CP schemes. As
usual, the axes are normalized to NoVar. Below each chart, we have the mean leakage power
consumed by the chips in the batch.
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Figure 3.16: Frequency versus leakage power for a batch of chips under various schemes.
The experiments correspond to reduced leakage for unchanged frequency, φ = 0.5 and
σ/µ = 0.12.
Comparing Chart (a) to (c)–(e), we see that, if we apply FGBB, most of the chips move to the
left noticeably. In all cases, while the frequencies of the chips do not change, the overall leakage
decreases substantially. Arch144T&CP is very effective, reducing the mean leakage per chip by 40%
over NoBB. Arch144T is also effective, as it manages a 34% leakage reduction over NoBB. Grid144
is less so, as it only accomplishes a 25% reduction. This result indicates that FGBB should use
architecture awareness.
Chart (b) shows that CoarseBB is unable to reduce the leakage power.
Figure 3.17 extends these experiments to all the BB environments, although we only show the
mean leakage power of the chips. For 64 and 144 cells per chip, our proposed ArchT&CP scheme
has the lowest leakage for a given number of cells. The ArchT scheme is slightly less effective,
and the Grid scheme is even less so. Therefore, for best performance, we recommend AA-FGBB
with both temperature and type of critical path awareness. When the number of cells is 16, Grid
performs relatively well. This is due to a pathological critical-path case. In any case, as the number
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of FGBB cells decreases, FGBB’s effectiveness goes down. These particular chips need 64 cells or
more.
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Figure 3.17: Mean leakage power of the chips in the batch for different BB schemes.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
4.1 Work Related to ReViveI/O
Masubuchi et al. [48] proposed adding a PDD to the kernel to support disk I/O recovery. Their
scheme corresponds to Stall in Section 2.5, which blocks disk writes until the next checkpoint [47].
ReViveI/O differs as follows: (i) instead of blocking, it buffers the data and commits them later in
the background, and (ii) it supports network I/O. More importantly, this study contributed with
the full implementation, testing, and evaluation of an efficient I/O undo/redo prototype compatible
with solutions such as ReVive [61] or SafetyNet [72].
High-availability machines such as HP’s Nonstop Architecture [25] and IBM’s S/390 main-
frames [71] attain fault tolerance through expensive hardware support, often involving extensive
component replication. We seek a less expensive design point.
Sequoia [3] is an SMP where mirrored main memory is considered to be the checkpointed state.
When a dirty line is evicted from a cache, a checkpoint is triggered. A checkpoint is also forced
every time a processor requests I/O, which is an inefficient approach.
OS- and library-based checkpointing includes UNICOS [41], KeyKOS [44], diskless checkpoint-
ing [60], and fault-tolerant Mach [66]. Their checkpoint interval is typically minutes or longer. This
results in high MTTR and would induce intolerably long message delays. Some schemes provide
disk I/O recovery by journaling, but none addresses network I/O recovery.
Database management systems (DBMS) have their own well-known I/O recovery mechanisms [21].
Checkpoint intervals are in the order of minutes to achieve low enough overheads, and the recovery
process takes tens of minutes [49] or more. For example, for System B of [49], targeting a 5-minute
database recovery time, incurs 8.2% overhead in throughput. Note that such database recovery
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time does not include the system recovery time (e.g., repair and reboot), which at least adds min-
utes. Similarly, targeting a 20-minute database recovery time incurs 6.6% overhead. Also, the fault
results in the loss of ongoing transactions. In contrast, for the frequent faults (MR faults), ReVive
plus ReViveI/O has three advantages: (i) ongoing transactions are not lost, (ii) the system recovers
in less than 1 second, and (iii) applications and kernel need no modification. When a DBMS runs
on ReVive with our I/O undo/redo layer, only the infrequent faults (NMR faults) trigger database
recovery. Consequently, the DBMS can use lower-overhead checkpointing, at the expense of longer
recovery time.
There are cluster options for databases such as Oracle RAC (Real Application Clusters) [57].
These solutions use multiple machines to provide higher system availability. However, to achieve
good performance, they require major changes to the database management system and, possibly,
to the applications that run on top of it.
Our mechanisms overlap with ideas from other works. Hu and Yang [28] proposed the Disk
Caching Disk (DCD), mainly to boost the performance of random disk writes; our disk buffer area
is like a DCD for reliability. Several systems, such as the Legato Prestoserve [51] and Baker et
al.’s scheme [2] have used NVRAM to speed up disk writes; we use NVRAM to speed up writes
within checkpoints. Our PDD can be thought of as a thin Virtual Machine (VM) for I/O; VMs
have been used for forward error recovery [9] and for post-intrusion replay [16], rather than for
rollback recovery of faults.
ReViveI/O is also related to transactional memory systems (TMS) [23]. TMS share similar I/O
issues with hardware-based memory checkpointing systems: when a transaction is aborted, TMS
need to undo any work done by that transaction, including I/O. On the other hand, there are some
differences: (i) TMS do not need to redo I/O after a transaction is aborted, (ii) TMS have less
emphasis on durability than memory checkpointing systems because their primary purpose is to
support atomicity, not reliability, and (iii) TMS may additionally need some mechanism to detect
and track the dependences and conflicts between threads that are induced by I/O operations.
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4.2 Work Related to Architecture-Aware Fine-Grain Body
Biasing
The problem of process variation has been known to the VLSI community for more than a decade,
but Borkar [4] is one of the first to take a computer architecture perspective. Borkar et al.’s efforts
at Intel to tackle this problem are summarized in [6, 5]. One of the approaches they propose is BB,
which is summarized in Section 3.2.
Stine et al. [74], Orshansky et al. [58], and Friedberg et al. [20] performed actual measurements
of test chips to characterize the magnitude and spatial distribution of dielectric thickness or gate
length variation. They observed that a significant portion of the WID variation is systematic. Cao
and Clark [11] proposed a model that attributes Vth variation to gate length variation and studied
the impact of spatial correlation on the delay of one critical path. For our Vth model, we build on
Friedberg et al.’s model. However, we have to additionally include the largely random effects of
material doping.
Microarchitecture work on variability was done by Bowman et al. [8], who derived a formula
for computing chip frequency by modeling critical paths in the chip in the presence WID process
variation. We use their formula in our work. The model was later extended by Marculescu and
Talpes [45] by assuming that the number of critical paths per pipeline stage is proportional to the
stage’s device count. They applied the model to GALS processors. Datta et al. [15] developed a
statistical approach for pipeline delay analysis to show the importance of logic depth in variability
analysis. Finally, Nassif [55] claimed that, in addition to PVT variations, wire delay variation is
important.
Chang and Sapatnekar [12] and Srivastava et al. [73] considered the impact of spatially correlated
variation on leakage and/or performance. They generated distributions on coarse grid points by
assuming a linear [12] or reciprocal [73] correlation function. They did not discuss trade-offs between
leakage/frequency and the various correlation lengths.
Although no technical detail is publicly available, it is claimed that Transmeta’s LongRun2 [80]
is able to dynamically adjust Vth to control leakage power. This scheme is thought to be effective
for D2D Vth variation.
59
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 ReViveI/O
The main contribution of this work is the full implementation, testing, and experimental evaluation
of ReViveI/O, an efficient scheme for I/O undo/redo that is compatible with high-frequency check-
pointing architectures such as ReVive and SafetyNet. In addition, we perform a sensitivity analysis
of what checkpoint frequencies are required to maintain acceptable throughput and response times.
Overall, this work completes the viability assessment of such novel memory-recovery architectures.
Our ReViveI/O prototype shows that low-overhead, tiny-MTTR recovery of I/O is feasible. For
20–120 ms between checkpoints, the throughput of a throughput-oriented workload such as TPC-C
on Oracle decreases by no more than 1%. Moreover, for 50 ms between checkpoints or less, the
response time of a latency-bound workload such as WebStone on Apache remains tolerable. In all
cases, the recovery time is practically negligible. Moreover, kernel, device drivers, and applications
remain unmodified. Finally, the combination of ReVive and ReViveI/O is likely to reduce the
throughput of TPC-C-class applications by 7% or less for 60–120 ms checkpoint intervals, while
incurring a tiny MTTR of less than 1 second.
Our analysis suggests that support for ReVive plus ReViveI/O makes for a very cost-effective
high-availability server. In general, compared to software-based recovery solutions (OS, library, and
database), our approach has a higher error coverage, lower overhead, and much smaller MTTR.
We estimate that it delivers a 2–3 orders of magnitude reduction in unavailability over a database
server that we evaluated. Finally, compared to hardware-intensive solutions such as HP NonStop
systems, it is much cheaper while maintaining high availability.
An avenue for future work is to apply our techniques to transactional memory systems. We
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expect that ReViveI/O can be applied to transactional memory systems by adding support for per-
thread output commit and for some dependence/conflict tracking mechanism through the Memory
Buffer.
5.2 Architecture-Aware Fine Grain Body Biasing
Parameter variation is the next big challenge for processor designers as technology moves below
65nm. While technology to handle variability will surely be developed at the lithographic, circuit
and layout levels, we believe that computer architecture techniques will play a key role in coping
with parameter variations. This study has introduced and demonstrated one such novel technique.
The main contribution of this work is to show that Fine-Grain Body Biasing (FGBB) is sub-
stantially more effective if cells are selected in an architecture-aware manner — largely following
the shapes of architectural modules. The rationale for Architecture-Aware FGBB (AA-FGBB) is
that architectural functionality is the main determinant of the temperature and the type of critical
path in a section of the chip, which in turn greatly impact the optimal BB to apply. The second
contribution is the development of a novel, parameterized model of WID Vth variation.
Our experiments with 200-chip batches show that AA-FGBB (Arch144T&CP) boosts chip
frequency substantially. Specifically, it pushes 35% of the chips into the top frequency bin, compared
to the 18% managed by advanced conventional FGBB (Grid144). Each of these improved chips
can potentially be priced 50% higher. Moreover, it also moves 82% of the chips into the top two
frequency bins, compared to the 14% that make it without any BB. These chips can potentially be
priced 3x and 2x higher than those in the bottom bin. Finally, if Arch144T&CP targets leakage
power, it reduces the average leakage of the chips by 40%, compared to the 25% reduction obtained
with Grid144.
Our results strongly recommend the use of AA-FGBB with both temperature and type of critical
path awareness. Moreover, the effectiveness holds for a wide range of Vth variation parameters.
Our current work involves providing an architecture-aware solution to voltage variation. We
are also examining the use of module replication to address variability.
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Appendix A
Detailed View of ReViveI/O
Operations
In this appendix, we present a closer look at how ReViveI/O (BufferVolatile scheme) works. For
simplicity, we consider only MR (memory-recoverable) faults and we assume that the fault detection
latency is negligibly small. Also, without loss of generality, we consider only one output request
and its performance. Note that the output is first requested by an application or by the operating
system and later, it is performed to physical devices, at which point the output becomes visible to
the outside world (the entities outside the scope of checkpoint and rollback recovery) for the first
time.
We begin with defining all the events that are relevant to a single output.
Events Definitions
R The output is requested.
P[ The system starts performing the output.
]P The system ends performing the output.
C[ Start of checkpointing.
]C{x} End of checkpointing. (The checkpoint contains information about x,
where x can be output request R or ∅.)
Table A.1: Definition of events related to a single output in ReViveI/O.
Figure A.1 shows a typical fault-free sequence of events involved with an output. It starts with
the previous checkpoint (]C{}). Then an output is requested (R). The request is not immediately
performed but buffered in PDD’s data structure (Memory Buffer). Later the system takes a
checkpoint, which includes the information about R held in Memory Buffer. After the checkpoint,
the actual output is performed.
]C{} R C[ ]C{R} P[ ]P
Figure A.1: An output in ReViveI/O without faults.
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Figure A.2 augments Figure A.1 with all the possible MR faults. It also considers the case of
long-lasting output operations that extend over multiple checkpoint intervals. The shaded region
corresponds to the events that are visible to the outside world. The diagram starts with checkpoint i.
]C{} R C[ ]C{R} P[ ]P
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
F7
C[ ]C{R}
i j
k
a
b
c
d
F8
e
Figure A.2: An output in ReViveI/O with faults.
We look at each fault in turn.
• F1: This is trivial. A fault happens after checkpoint i. The system rolls back to checkpoint i
and resumes execution.
• F2: When the system rolls back to checkpoint i, any information about R is lost. How-
ever, since this sequence of operations is hidden to the outside world, it does not incur any
inconsistency.
• F3: This is a fault while a checkpoint is being taken. It is handled in the same way as F2.
• F4: The system rolls back to checkpoint j, which contains information about R. Therefore, R
is guaranteed to be performed later. (Transition a corresponds to the case where the system
is busy and R waits long to be performed.)
• F5: The system rolls back to checkpoint j and performs the output from the beginning.
Before the rollback, the outside world might be able to see the partial output. If it is a disk
write, the complete data will be written shortly (Here, we depend on the idempotent nature of
disk writes). If it is a network data transmission, the partial packet is almost surely dropped
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at the receiving end due to checksum error or length mismatch, and the correct packet will
be resent later.
• F6: If no checkpoint has been taken after checkpoint j, the system rolls back to j (transition c)
and R is performed from the beginning. On the other hand, if the output operation has taken
so long that its duration involves one or more checkpoints (k), the system rolls back to the
latest checkpoint of those (transition d). Note that since P was not finished when the system
started taking checkpoint k, the information about R is not purged from Memory Buffer and
is held in checkpoint k. Therefore, R will be performed from the beginning via transition e.
In both cases, the output is performed more than once. We again depend on the idempotent
nature of the output in consideration (i.e., disk writes and TCP data transmissions).
• F7: The system rolls back to checkpoint j and the output is performed from the beginning.
• F8: The system rolls back to checkpoint k and the output is performed from the beginning
via transition e.
Note that although we draw self loops for the faults in Figure A.2 for the sake of completeness,
simultaneous multiple faults or faults during recovery are not always memory-recoverable.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Background of the
Process Variation
B.1 Statistics
Correlation Function. The covariance of two random variablesX and Y is defined as cov(X,Y ) =
E[(X−E[X])(Y −E[Y ])]. For a location-dependent random variable Z(~x), its correlation function is
defined as ρ(~x, ~y) = cov(Z(~x), Z(~y))/var(Z) (|ρ| ≤ 1). In the spherical model, ρ(~x, ~y) is a function
of r ≡ |~x− ~y| and is defined as:
ρφ(r) =
 1− (3r/2φ) + (r/φ)
3/2 if r ≤ φ
0 otherwise.
Note that since we are only considering WID variation, ρ(∞) is zero.
Leakage Computation. Under a constant temperature, a transistor’s subthreshold leakage cur-
rent is written as follows:
Ileak = I0e
−qVth/kT (B.1)
Given a normal distribution N(µ, σ2) for Vth, the leakage current in the chip is the integral of
Eq. (B.1):
Ileak =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(x−µ)2/2σ2√
2piσ
I0e
−qx/kTdx = I0leake
(qσ/kT )2/2,
where I0leak = I0e
−qµ/kT .
Frequency Computation. For a random variable Z, we denote the ratio of its standard deviation
and its average by RZ (i.e., RZ =
√
var(Z)/E[Z]). Under a constant temperature, the delay of a
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gate can be written as:
Tg =
KV
(V − Vth)α
, (B.2)
whereK is a technology-dependent constant and α is typically 1.3 [67]. Given a normal distribution
N(µ, σ2) for Vth, we write Vth = µ+ σδ, and δ is distributed N(0, 12). For the common case when
|δ|  (V − µ)/σ, we re-write Eq. (B.2) as Tg ≈ KV(V−µ)α
[
1 + αRV/µ−1δ
]
, where R = σ/µ. This
shows that the gate delay also follows a normal distribution N(µTg, σ2Tg), where µTg =
KV
(V−µ)α and
σTg = RTg · µTg = αRV/µ−1µTg .
Let Tcp be the delay of a critical path. The average value of Tcp is µTcp = ncpµTg, where ncp
is the number of gates in the critical path. Let Tgi = µTg + σTgδi (1 ≤ i ≤ ncp) be the delay of the
ith gate in the critical path (δi follows N(0, 12)). Then, the variance of Tcp is computed as:
σ2Tcp = E[{
ncp∑
i=1
(Tgi − µTg)}2] = σ2Tg
ncp∑
i=1
E[δ2i ] +
∑
i6=j
E[δiδj ]

= σ2Tg(ncp +
∑
i6=j
ρ(dij)),
where ρ is the correlation function of Vth and dij denotes the distance between the ith and jth
gates i in the critical path. We assumed that the correlation function is uniform and isotropic.
In the spherical model, σTcp depends on the distance between the gates in the path relative to
φ. If the distance between the gates is  φ, their Vth is very correlated (ρ(dij) ≈ 1). If we
assume perfect correlation, the critical path delay is normally distributed, the variance is highest
and σTcp/µTcp = σTg/µTg. If, instead, the distance between the gates is high compared to φ, the
gates are more independent of each other (ρ(dij) ≈ 0). In the limit, if we assume no correlation,
the critical path delay is also normally distributed, the variance is lowest because the random
component tends to cancel itself and σTcp/µTcp = σTg/
√
ncpµTg.
We derive the probability distribution of the longest delay, max{Tcp}, and the chip frequency.
For a random variable Z, let PDFZ(x) and CDFZ(x) denote the probability density function and
the cumulative density function, respectively, of Z. Let us assume that Tcp follows N(µTcp , σ
2
Tcp).
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Following the argument of Bowman et al. [8],
CDFmax{Tcp}(x) = Pr(max{Tcp} ≤ x) = CDFTcp(x)Ncp ,
where Ncp is the number of independent critical paths in a chip. Therefore,
PDFmax{Tcp}(x) =
d
dx
CDFmax{Tcp}(x) = NcpPDFTcp(x)CDFTcp(x)
Ncp−1.
Since the chip frequency f is inversely proportional to max{Tcp}, PDFf (x) = x−2PDFmax{Tcp}(x−1).
If we consider the normalized frequency f/f0 (f0 = µ−1Tcp), we have
PDFf/f0(x) = x
−2 Ncp√
2piRTcp
exp
[
−(x
−1 − 1)2
2R2Tcp
] [
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
x−1 − 1√
2RTcp
))]Ncp−1
,
where erf is the error function and RTcp = σTcp/µTcp . When the gates in a critical path are
fully correlated, Tcp has the largest variation and RTcp = RTg =
αR
V/µ−1 . Figure B.1 shows the
distribution of chip frequency for such case for various values of Ncp.
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Figure B.1: Probability distribution of chip frequency for Ncp = 100, 1000, and 10000.
B.2 Theory of Die-to-Die and Within-Die Variations
Die-to-die (D2D) variation can be modeled as Vth of all the gates in a die having a same offset
from the average Vth of a wafer: V D2Dth = Vth +∆Vth. If we define the D2D variability by R
D2D =
∆Vth/Vth, the leakage current is ID2Dleak = Ileak exp
[
− q∆VthkT
]
= Ileak exp
[
− qVthkT ·RD2D
]
and the gate
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delay is TD2Dg =
(
V−Vth−∆Vth
V−Vth
)−α
Tg ≈
(
1 + αV−Vth
∆Vth
)
Tg =
(
1 + αV/Vth−1
RD2D
)
Tg, thus the
chip frequency is fD2D =
(
1− αV/Vth−1R
D2D
)
f . When we consider both die-to-die and within-die
variations of Vth, we obtain a frequency-leakage plot like below.
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Figure B.2: The effect of die-to-die and within-die variations on the frequency and the leakage
Suppose we are given a die-to-die variation of −4% and a within-die variation of 6% (Point A
in Figure B.2). By applying a chip-wide uniform body bias (our fine-grain body biasing can easily
do this), we can remove the die-to-die variation (A → B). Moreover, we can reduce the within-die
variation by applying fine-grain body bias (B → C). As it is clear from the figure, coarse-grain
body biasing (one body bias per chip) trades off the reduction in leakage against the decrease in
frequency. On the other hand, fine-grain body biasing can improve both frequency and leakage,
although its effect might be somewhat obscured by the temperature variation.
B.3 Acceptable Region for Chips
We bound the Acceptable Region for the chip in Figure B.3 as follows. The slanted line is given
by setting the sum of the dynamic and leakage powers to a constant:
K1 = PDyn + PLeak = K2 × Freq + PLeak (B.3)
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we can determine K1 and K2 if we know, for one of the points in the line, (i) its coordinates and
(ii) the ratio between its dynamic and leakage power. We (somewhat arbitrarily) choose the NoVar
chip to belong to the line — the chip without any process-induced Vth variation. For NoVar, we
know its frequency (6 GHz), and we measure its dynamic and leakage power. Other choices are
possible. Finally, we set the horizontal line to be 85% the NoVar frequency. We chose this number
according to Intel’s Xeon processor family at 90nm, which is marketed with a 15% frequency range
(3 to 3.6 GHz) [31].
F
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Figure B.3: Acceptable region for chips
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